W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects

Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects

1976

Relative Deprivation and Ghetto Riots
Joseph Daniel Sekul
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd
Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Public Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Sekul, Joseph Daniel, "Relative Deprivation and Ghetto Riots" (1976). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters
Projects. Paper 1539624948.
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-fzhz-gy11

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND
i'
GHETTO RIOTS

A Thesis

Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Government
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Joseph D. Sekul
1976

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Author

Approved, August 1976

ter

GeoraeX W.

aX

Alan J. Ware

ii

848242

DEDICATION

To Diane

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

.

v

LIST OF TABLES

vi

LIST OF FIGURES
ABSTRACT

. .

.

vii

.

viii

INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I.
CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER III.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

2
THE GENESIS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

. .

GHETTO TURMOIL IN THE UNITED STATES.
MEASUREMENT AND TESTING .

7
49
101
125

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer wishes to express his appreciation to
Professors Donald J. Baxter, George W. Grayson,

and

Alan J. Ward for their careful criticism and patience
throughout this investigation.

v

LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table
1.

Character of the Riots •• •

58

2.

Grievances Behind the Riots

60

3.

Black Income,

1947-1966

65

4.

Black Rights Discussion

79

5.

Perceived Obstacles to Imployment

81

6.

Effectiveness of Watts Riot

92

7.

Why the Riots Helped .

94

8.

City Government Action

9.

Correlation Matrix for Equation la .

112

10.

Correlation Matrix for Equation 2a .

115

11.

Correlation Matrix for Equation 3

118

12.

Correlation Matrix for Equation 4

119

vi

•

96

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

Page

1.

Need Satisfaction and Revolution

.

2.

Aspriational Deprivation .

23

3.

Decremental Deprivation

25

4.

Progressive Deprivation

26

5.

Misery Model

28

6.

Determinants of Civil Strife

7.

Coercive Force Size

8.

Modified Progressive Deprivation

.
.

10

31
33
.

72

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to test Ted Robert
Gurr's relative deprivation theory of political violence.
The basic premise of the theory is that .objective levels
of material and social well-being do not determine m e n ’s
willingness to engage in violence against the state.
Rather, it is how people view their actual attainments
relative to their expected attainments that motivates
them to rebel.
An assessment of G u r r ’s own tests of his theory
found the results inconclusive.
His use of a multi-nation
sample forced Gurr to measure deprivation in very general
terms that left it unclear whether his results supported
a relative deprivation theory, or whether they were equal
ly consistent with a rival misery model which held objec
tive deterioration in popular welfare to be the basis of
civil- unrest.
In the hope of resolving this ambiguity, the
author chose the ghetto riots which took place in the
United States between 1964 and 1968 as the setting for
tests of a new relative deprivation model.
The strategy
was that, by limiting attention to a single country, it
would be possible to measure deprivation in sufficient
detail to set it apart from alternate concepts.
Statistical tests of the new model provided strong
evidence to refute Gurr's theory.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND
GHETTO RIOTS

INTRODUCTION

This study is an attempt to test a theory of p o 
litical violence.

The theory was formulated by Ted Robert

Gurr who hypothesizes that a sense of relative deprivation
is a necessary precondition for the occurrence of collec
tive violence of any kind,

including political violence.^

The basic premise of Gurr's relative deprivation argument
is that simple or absolute losses of valued social goods
are insufficient to motivate people to commit acts of v i o 
lence.

Rather,

it is necessary that such losses be p e r 

ceived as unjustified relative to some standard of j us 
tice .

It is this perception of a discrepancy between n o 

tions of what people ought to have and what they do have-what Gurr terms "relative deprivation"--that leads to

^"Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife:
A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," American P o 
litical Science R e v i e w , LXII (December, 1968); see also
Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Prince
ton University Press, 1970;-and, Ted Robert Gurr with
Charles Ruttenberg, The Condition of Civil Violence:
First Tests of a Causal Model (Princeton, N.J.:
Center
For International Studies, 1967).

2.

3.
strife,

and not simple declines in well-being.

The links

in the causal chain between relative deprivation and v i o 
lence are the emotional states of frustration and then
anger that flow from a sense of relative deprivation.
While Gurr asserts that the results of his own
tests provide strong support for his theory,
in which the key concept

the manner

(relative deprivation)

tionalized leads one to question this claim.

is opera

Apart from

the fact that no direct measures were used for the "state
of mind" variables of frustration and anger,

the index

constructed for relative deprivation was based largely on
the type of political and economic deprivations that would
be equally appropriate for an index of absolute depriva
tion.

Hence it remains an open question as to whether

the results cited by Gurr as providing confirmation for
his relative deprivation model are not equally consistent
with an absolute deprivation model.
This inconclusiveness could have been avoided if
Gurr had specified which of three distinct types of rela
tive deprivation models obtained in each of the 114 cases
in his cross-national sample.

At least two of the models

are sufficiently diverse in their objectively measureable
properties to distinguish them from absolute deprivation

4.
models;

test results consistent with one of the two

relative deprivation models could not easily be regarded
as consistent with an absolute deprivation model.
however,

Gurr,

chose not to follow this procedure, working in

stead with the very broad index of deprivation mentioned
above.
A need therefore exists for studies in which the
relevant deprivation models are defined in sufficient de
tail to set them apart from their alternatives.

It is to

meet this need that the present study was conceived.

The

study focuses on the ghetto riots which took place in the
United States between 1964 and 1968.

Based on a survey

of conditions affecting blacks in the years prior to the
riots, a "progressive" relative deprivation model was con
structed and tested.

A progressive model is one in which

a steady upward improvement in objective conditions is
the "normal" expectation;

the impetus to violence comes

when expectations of improvement are not met.
tain modifications,

With cer

this model seemed most appropriate in

light of the growth in black incomes and educational attainments in the decade prior to the riots.

2

This

2
The Kerner Commission pointed out that between
1947 and 1966 the number of blacks earning an annual

5.
progressive relative deprivation model is clearly
distinct from an absolute deprivation model,

the latter

premised on a real decline in positively valued goods and
conditions.
In addition to relative deprivation,
independent variables were defined.

four other

They were:

police

department s i z e , welfare expenditures, government expen
ditures , and prior r i o t s .
riot m a g n i t u d e .
sion analysis.

The dependent variable was

The model was tested by means of regres
Cities with a population of one-hundred-

thousand or greater in 1950 were chosen as the units of
analysis.
ever,

Originally 169 such cities were selected.

How

insufficient data on a large number necessitated

falling back on a sample of seventy some cities in the
final tests of the regression model.
The study is divided into three parts.

The Gurr

model is presented and its deficiencies discussed in the

income of $7,000 and over had gone from 7 percent to 28
percent.
(The National Advisory Commission on Civil D i s 
orders (Kerner Commission), Report of the National A d v i 
sory Commission on Civil Disorders [New York:
Bantam
Books, Inc., 1968], p. 252.)
And Sears and McConahay
noted that, while in 1940 black men aged 25 to 29 aver
aged only 6.5 years of education, in 1962 they averaged
11 years of schooling.
(David 0. Sears and John B.
McConahay, The Politics of Violence:
The New Urban
Blacks and the Watts Riot [Boston:
The Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1973], p. 19.)

6.
first chapter.

In Chapter Two, the progressive depriva

tion model thought to represent best the basis of black
discontent is developed.
is operationalized,

In the third chapter the model

and the results of the regression

analysis are presented.
The conclusion reached is that relative depriva
tion, as defined in this study,
ri ot in g.

is not related to ghetto

CHAPTER I
THE GENESIS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Opinions differ on the conditions that launch men
into violent struggle against the state.

Marx and Engels

adopted the intuitively appealing view that men strike
out at established authority after economic conditions
have deteriorated beyond endurance.

In the Communist

Manifesto they painted a picture of the progressive m i s 
ery of the industrial laborer that would be the ground
work for the coming revolution:
The modern labourer . . . instead of rising with the
progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below
the conditions of existence of his own class.
He b e 
comes a pauper, and pauperism developes more rapidly
than population and wealth. . . . (A) workman is r e 
stricted, almost entirely, to the means of subsistence'
that he requires for his maintenance, and for the
propagation of his race.
Eric Hoffer,

on the other hand, doubted the capa

city of men to rise up in anger under the weight of such

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the
Communist P a r t y , in The Marx-Engels R e a d e r , ed. by Robert
C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton 6c Company, Inc., 1972),
pp. 341; 345.

7.

8.
crushing b u r d e n s .
Where people toil from sunrise to sunset for a bare
living, they nurse no grievances and dream no dreams.
. . . To be engaged in a desperate struggle for food
and shelter is to be wholly free from a sense of fu
tility.
The goals are concrete and immediate.
Every
meal is a fulfillment; to go to sleep on a full stom
ach is a triumph; and every windfall a miracle.
Observations made by two other students of revolution sup
port Hoffer.

Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out that the

French Revolution of 1789 was not preceded by a pattern
of growing misery.

Rather,

"the French found their con

dition the more unsupportable in proportion to its im
provement."

He went on to argue that in general,

"Revo

lutions are not always brought about by a decline from
bad to worse

.

. The regime which is destroyed is al3

most always an improvement on its immediate predecessor."
After his study of five revolutions,
to a similar conslusion:

2

Crane Brinton came

"Our revolutions did not occur

Eric Hoffer, The True Believer
& Row, Publishers, 1966), pp. 32-33.

(New York: Harper

3
Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the
French Revolution (New York: Harper, 1856), p. 214.
Quoted in James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolu
tion," in When Men Revolt and W h y , ed. by James C. Davies
(New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 135.

9.
in societies undergoing widespread and long-term economic
misery or depression."^
Although these two views appear to contradict one
another, James Davies feels that they can be reconciled,
"if they are juxtaposed and put in the proper time se
quence."^

According to Davies,

Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged
period of objective economic and social development
is followed by a short period of sharp reversal.
The
all important effect on the minds of people in a p a r 
ticular society is to produce, during the former p e r 
iod, an expectation of continued ability to satisfy
needs--which continue to rise--and, during the latter,
a mental state of anxiety and frustration when m a n i 
fest reality breaks away from anticipated reality.
The actual state of socioeconomic development is less
significant than the expectation that past progress,
no w blocked, can and must continue in the future.
Figure 1 graphically depicts the above pattern of devel
opments.

Expressed in other terms,

frustrated hope, not

hopeless despair brings on revolution.
Davies'

identification of frustration as the link

between objective social developments and revolution,
served as the point of departure for Ted Robert Gurr in
4

Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution
York: Vintage Books, 1965), p. 29.
^Davies, When Men Revolt and W h y , p. 135.
^Ib id .

(New

10.
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11.
the formulation of his own theory of political violence.
Gurr builds on D a v i e s ’ work by retaining his insight that
frustration grows out of unmet expectations,

and then ex

panding on Davies' model--commonly referred to as the
"J-Curve" model--in three ways:

First, Gurr seeks to ex 

plain all forms of political violence, not just full-scale
revolutions.

Second, D a v i e s ’ association between revolu

tions and prior frustrations is set on a firmer footing
by relating it to an established theory in psychology.
Whereas Davies simply assumes that frustrations are suf
ficient to explain revolutions,

Gurr seeks justification

for the relationship by drawing on research done by ex
perimental psychologists on the relationship between
frustration and violent behavior.

From their work he d e 

rives the concept of relative deprivation, seen by him as
the socio-political counterpart of frustration.

Relative

deprivation stands as the key explanatory variable in
Gurr's theory;

it is proposed as a necessary precondition

for political violence.

Finally, Gurr broadens Davies'

notion of a gap between needs and expectations to cover
any situation in which expectations significantly exceed
actual gratifications, not just those in which previously
rising needs satisfactions suddenly decline relative to

12.
need expectations.

Gurr's theory,

in short, encompasses

the J-Curve model, but includes other patterns of discong
tent as well.
Notwithstanding these differences between
Gurr and Davies,

a general argument is common to both:

the key to explaining violent unrest is not the severity
of social conditions, but their potential for evoking in
tense feelings of frustration,

anxiety and discontent;

and, that potential derives from what people have r el a
tive to what they expected.

Interestingly enough, Davies

points out that Marx himself came to this conclusion in
works written after the Communist M a n i f e s t o .

In one of

those later works Marx described the preconditions of
widespread unrest in the following terms.
A noticeable increase in wages presupposes a rapid
growth of productive capital.
The rapid growth of
productive capital brings about an equally rapid
growth of wealth, luxury, social wants, social enjoy
ments.
Thus, although the enjoyments of the workers
have risen, the social satisfaction that they give
has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoy
ments of the worker . . . Our desires and pleasures
spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by
society and not by the objects which serve for their

o

Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1970), P a s s i m , Chaps. 1-2.

13.
satisfaction.
Because they are of a social nature,
they are of a relative n a t u r e .^
Let us now take a closer look at Gurr's theory.
f

First, Gurr's definitions and explanations of the concepts
of political violence and relative deprivation will be
examined.

Second,

three models formulated by Gurr to d e 

scribe how a sense of relative deprivation develops under
particular sets of social circumstances will be discussed.
Finally,

an assessment will be made of G u r r ’s efforts to

provide empirical support for his theory through statis
tical analysis.

Why Men Rebel:
Relative Deprivation
and Political Violence
Gurr seeks to explain all forms of political v i o 
lence.

Taken literally, political violence could encom

pass violence initiated by government elites and directed
against the citizenry at large.

However,

this kind of governmental violence,

Gurr excludes

and limits the con

cept of violence whose target is the "political r e g i m e " :
Political violence refers to all collective attacks
within a political community against the political
9

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "Wage Labour and
Capital," Selected Works in Two Volumes (Moscow: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1955), I, p. 94.
Quoted in
Davies, When Men Revolt and W h y , p. 135.

14.
regime, its actors--including competing political
groups as well as incumbents--or its policies . . .
The concept subsumes revolution, ordinarily defined
as fundamental sociopolitical change accomplished
through violence.
It also includes guerilla wars,
coups d ’etat, rebellions, and riots.10
Political violence is presented as a sub-set of
collective v i o l e n c e , which Gurr never really defines e x 
cept to indicate that it is violence by collectivities
directed against agents having nothing to do with the p o 
litical system.

Collective violence becomes political

violence when men's "attitudes and beliefs focus it on
* political objects, and when institutional frameworks are
weak enough,

or opposition strong enough to give the dis

contented a sense of p o t e n c y . C o l l e c t i v e violence in
turn can be subsumed under aggressive behavior in general,
whether initiated by individuals or by groups.
Gurr's schema,

Under

it follows that theories which explain a g 

gression can also be used to explain collective and polit
ical violence.

^ G u r r , Why Men R e b e l , pp.
11I b i d ., p. 155.

3-4.

15.
Frustration and Aggression
There are at least three distinguishable psycho
logical assumptions about the sources of human aggres
sion, according to Gurr:
stinctive,

"That aggression is solely in

that it is solely learned,* or that it is an

innate response activated by frustration."

12

While the

first two assumptions are not rejected entirely, Gurr
feels that frustration theory is better supported by em
pirical research,

and therefore more persuasive.

Frustration is defined as "an interference with
goal-directed behavior";

aggression "is behavior designed

to injure, physically or otherwise,
is directed."

13

those toward whom it

The link between frustration and aggres

sion is held to be deeply rooted in m a n ’s nature:

"The

disposition to respond aggressively when frustrated is
part of man's biological makeup;
inherent tendency,
trating agent."

14

there is a biologically

in men and animals,

to attack the frus-

The basic postulate on the relation

ship between frustration and aggression was formulated by

12I b i d ., p. 31.
13Ibid., p. 33
14Ibid.

16.
John Dollard and his colleagues at Yale in 1939.
ing to them,

Acco rd 

"the occurrence of aggressive behavior a l 

ways presupposes the existance of frustration and, contrawise,

that the existence of frustration always leads

to some form of aggression."

15

The second half of this

postulate has come in for considerable attack,

the coun

terargument being that other responses to frustration b e 
sides aggression are possible., including withdrawal,
sion, and,

eva

in the case of children, regression in the

form of lowered intellectual performance.
Whether these alternate responses are forthcoming
depends on other factors which interact with frustrations.
Leonard Berkowitz,
anger,

for example, argues that the drive of

aroused by frustration,

does not necessarily

lead to specific behavior (aggression in this case)
unless there are appropriate cues or r e le as er s.
These cues are stimuli bearing some degree of asso
ciation with the anger instigator . . . A frustration
creates a predisposition to make hostile responses by
arousing anger.
Whether these responses are actually
performed, however, depends in part upon the presence
of suitable aggression-evoking cues.

sion
p. 1.

^~*John Dollard, et_ al. , Frustration and Ag gr es 
(New Haven, C o n n . : Yale University Press, 1939),

16

Leonard B e r ko wi tz , Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company,
1962), p. 33.

17.
Fear is another qualifying factor.

While anger predis-

«

poses people to strike out against the source of frustra
tion,
check.

fear of the consequences may hold the attack in
17

Also learning can serve to inhibit aggression.

Some may have learned to redouble their efforts in the
face of their wishes being thwarted; others to suppress
violent impulses because they are out of keeping with a
moral code.
Gurr accepts the validity of these and other crit
icisms when made in support of the proposition that aggression is not the only possible effect of frustration.

18

However, he argues that they must be put in proper p e r 
spective:

"These findings and observations are qualifi

cations of the basic frustration-aggression thesis, not
refutations of it."

19

The frustration aggression me ch a n 

ism remains "a motivating force that disposes men to

"^Gurr, Why Men R e b e l , p. 35.
18

In fact Gurr argues that the authors of the
original Yale study made sufficiently clear in the second
half of their work that they never intended to imply that
aggression was the only possible response to frustration.
Gurr, Why Men R e b e l , p. 33.

19

Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 34.

18.
aggression."

20

Granted certain factors can modify the

basic impulse to aggression,

their so doing does not con-

»

stitute sufficient grounds for completely disregarding
the frustration aggression syndrome,

any more than fac

tors qualifying the law of gravity justify completely ig
noring it.

The theory of flight modifies the basic grav

itational principle that objects immediately fall back to
earth; objects with certain aerodynamic properties clearly
do not.

But the law of gravity is still in force since,

in the absence of such aerodynamic properties, objects
will behave in accord with it.

So too, Gurr argues, with

the frustration-aggression mechanism.

The innate dispo

sition to strike out at sources of frustration is subject
to modification by men's beliefs,
environment.

inhibitions,

and social

This does not mean it does not exist.

such factors are not operating,
gression will reassert itself.

When

the disposition to ag-

21

It should be pointed out that not all the factors
that modify aggression act to inhibit it; some,
social climate that glorifies retribution,

^Ibi d . , p . 36
21

Ibid

such as a

can facilitate

19.
aggression.

And factors like aggressive cues, whose

absence is cited to predict a lack of aggression,
conversely,

foster

cuts both ways.

it

when present.

can,

"Modification”

What is called for then,

is the kind of

multivariate model Gurr ultimately formulates; one which
includes variables thought to check aggression and others
thought to facilitate it.

Relative Deprivation
Rather than making a direct application of the
frustration-aggression framework to political violence,
Gurr chooses instead to work with the concept of relative
deprivation.

He defines relative deprivation as "a p e r 

ceived discrepancy between m e n ’s value expectations and
their value capabilities.”

"Value expectations," are

"the goods and conditions of life to which people believe
they are rightfully entitled";

"value capabilities" are

"the goods and conditions they think they are capable of
attaining or maintaining."

22

The basis for the shift in

concepts is partly semantical appropriateness.

Apparently

Gurr feels the frustration-aggression concepts are too
tied to settings involving individuals only;
22

Ibid., p. 23.

an alternate

20.
terminology is necessary to relate the basic frustrationaggression dynamic to situations involving groups.

He

points out that the frustration-aggression principles
operate in a wide range of individual behavior, in
cluding the actions of those in rebellion against
their political community.
We need concepts and
hypotheses better suited to analyzing the social and
psychological transactions that provide the impetus
to political violence among members of a
collectivity. "^3
The concpets of "value capabilities" and "value expecta
tions" seem to meet the above need for Gurr,

although he

never provides a wholly satisfying explanation for why
this is so.

Possibly it is because "values" and general

levels of value attainments can be used more readily in
reference to groups,

than the notion of a single specific

goal pursued by an individual.

The latter is the typical

focus in psychological studies of frustration.

A second

substantive reason for preferring the concept of relative
deprivation is the need Gurr feels to emphasize the crit
ical matter of perception.

He provides that emphasis by

making the distinction between a frustrating situation
and subjective awareness of frustration, and incorporat
ing that distinction into the definition of relative

23

Ibid., p. 36.

21.
deprivation:
A frustrating situation can be defined as one in
which the actor is, judged by objective standards,
thwarted by some social or physical barrier in a t 
tempts to continue enjoyment of a value.
The actor
can be said to be frustrated, however, only when he
is aware of the interference.
The awareness of inter
ference is equivalant to the concept of relative dep
rivation as defined a b o v e .
These stipulations should not, however,

obscure

the intimate relationship between relative deprivation
and the frustration-aggression dynamic.

Once the percep

tion of a discrepancy between value expectations and capa
bilities takes place,

it is the basic frustration-

aggression mechanism which is engaged to provide the "ba
sic motivational link between RD [relative deprivation]
and the potential for collective violence."

25

Patterns of Relative Deprivation
Gurr isolates two sets of conditions which give
rise to relative deprivation.

First,

"societal conditions

that increase the average level or intensity of expecta
tions without increasing capabilities increase the
24

Ted Robert Gurr with Charles Ruttenberg, The
Conditions of Civil Violence:
First Tests of a Causal
Model (Princeton, N.J.: Center for International Studies,
1967), p. 4.
25

Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p . 36.

22
26
intensity of discontent.11

This type of situation

brings on what Gurr terms "aspirational deprivation,11 and
is illustrated in Figure 2.

"The value gains of other

groups and the promise of new opportunities" are two g en 
eral conditions that give rise to aspirational deprivation, according to Gurr.

27

One would expect to find it

in fairly traditional societies suddenly exposed to new
ways of life through modern communications media, or, in
some cases through exposure to foreign cultures encount
ered in the course of wartime service in the army of a
colonial ruler.

28

A second pattern of relative deprivation stems
from a decrease in value capabilities without a corres
ponding decrease in expectations:
Societal conditions that decrease men's average
value position without decreasing their value
expectations similarly increase deprivation, and
hence the intensity of discontent.29
This is called "decremental deprivation" and is depicted

^ I b i d . , p. 13
27Ibid.
2^ I b i d ., p . 51
29
*Ib id ., p. 13

23.
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30

2.--Aspirational Deprivation

30

Ibid., p. 51.
See also Daniel L e r n e r , The Pa ss 
ing of Traditional Society:
Modernizing in the Middle
East (New York: The Free Press, 1958) for a good discus
sion on the genesis of aspirations in the modern era.

24.
in Figure 3.

In general terms,

it can result from,

inflexibility of value stocks in a society,
deteriorations in a groups'

"the

short-term

conditions of life, and limi-

tations on its structural opportunities."

31

Examples of

decremental deprivation would be the loss of influence by
elite groups or the decline in the status of middle class
groups relative to working classes.

In its most severe

form it would be found in traditional societies in the
wake of natural catastrophes--floods, earthquakes, and
the like.

Such societies typically lack the capacity to

bounce back possessed by modern industrial countries.
The third type of deprivation,

"progressive de p

rivation," is identical to the Davies J-Curve model p r e 
sented earlier.

As shown in Figure 4, it contains ele

ments of the aspirational and decremental patterns in that
value expectations go up and capabilities drop off rela
tive to expectations.

However,

in this case capabilities

initially keep pace with rising expectations before the
decline sets in.

One would expect transitional societies

with transitional groups in them to be especially prone
to progressive deprivation.
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Polities of this type have

Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 47.

High

Value Expectations
Collective
Value
Position

Value Capabilities

Low

Time

Fig. 3.--Decremental Deprivation

26.

High

Value Expectations

Value Capabilities

Low

Time

Fig. 4.--Progressive Deprivation
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Ibid., p. 53.

27.
achieved some type of

'take-off1 but have not yet

developed a set of sufficiently stable institutions to
insure sustained growth.
Each of these three models is in contrast to the
absolute deprivation or misery model put forth by Marx
and Engels in their earlier writings.

The misery model

would be G u r r 1s decremental deprivation model minus
the expectations

(see Figiire 5) .

The misery model goes

against the basic premise common to all three of G u r r 1s
relative deprivation m o d e l s :

discontent is relative to

expectations; or, borrowing from Hoffer,
capacity of men to dream dreams.

is born of the

In line with this Gurr

posits that, other factors to be discussed later being
equal,

the greater the discrepancy between value expecta

tions and capabilities,
political violence.

the greater the potential for

34

Ibid., Passim, chaps. 2-3.
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High

Turmoil breaks
out here

Collective
Value
Position

Value
Capabilities

Subsistence
Low

Time

Fig. 5.--Misery Model

29.
Empirical Support
Gurr has made two major tests of his relative
deprivation model--one in 1966,

35

the other in 1968.

36

Results of the latter test were published in the American
Political Science Review in December of 1968.

The results

of both tests were cited in support of propositions dis
cussed at much greater length in Why Men R e b e l , G u r r 1s
most comprehensive statement of his theory published in
1970.

However,

since the model in the 1968 study is p r e 

sented by Gurr as an improvement over the model in the
earlier study, the analysis to follow will be addressed
to the 1968 findings.
In accord with G u r r 1s acknowledgement that other
variables interact with a deprivation-induced impulse to
aggression, his 1968 study contained a multivariate r e 
gression model with five other independent variables b e 
side deprivation.

The other independent variables were

labeled institutionalization, legitimacy, coercive
35

Gurr with Ruttenberg,

Conditions of Civil

Violence.
Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil
Strife:
A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," A m e r 
ican Political Science R e v i e w , LXII (December, 1968),
pp. 1104-1124.
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potential,

facilitation, and past stri fe ; the dependent

variable was civil s t ri fe .

The model,

along with the r e 

sults of the regression analysis is presented in Figure
6.

The figures at the top of each cell are the

2
simple r between the variable and civil strife, i.e.,
the proportion of variation in the measure of strife
accounted for by each independent variable separately.
The percentages are the proportion of explained v a r 
iance accounted for by each variable when the effects
37
of all others are controlled. '
For present purposes an extended explanation of the a r 
rows is not necessary except to say that the arrows indi
cate the direction of causal relationships either between
the independent variables and civil strife, or among the
independent v a r i a b l e s ; pluses and minuses indicate whether
the relationships are positive or negative.
Coercive potential is based on the simple size of
coercive forces at the disposal of the government,

sup

plemented by measures of the loyalty of such f o r c e s .

The

underlying causal proposition behind the coercive p o te ntial variable is as f o l l o w s :

The relationship between

the simple size of coercive forces at the disposal of the
regime and the level of strife perpetrated by aggrieved

37Ibid., p. 1121.
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citizens striking out at the regime is held to be
curvilinear.

This is depicted in Figure 7.

The curvilinear nature of the relationship derives
from changes in the relative impact of anger and fear as
coercive force size increases.
erate levels of coercion,
nant emotion.

Initially,

anger is proposed as the domi

Coercion at these states does nothing to

relieve anger spawned by deprivations.
is add to it.

at low to m o d 

What it does do

People are more angry at having their ex

pression of grievances interfered with,

than they are

fearful of the consequences of such expression,

and this

is reflected in a steady climb in civil strife levels up
to the mid-ranges of coercive force size.
point,

the pattern is reversed,

Past that

as fear begins to over

ride anger with each increment in coercion.

Gurr accepts

the validity of this relationship, but argues that when
the loyalty of the r e g i m e ’s armed forces is taken into
account,

the curvilinear pattern will be replaced by a

negative linear relationship.

The results of G u r r 1s em-

pirical analysis support both hypotheses.

39Ibid., p. 1118.
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Fig. 7.--Coercive Force Size

40Ibid

Large

40

34.
Institutionalization refers to,

"the extent to

which societal structures beyond the primary level are
broad in scope,

command substantial resources and/or per-

sonnel, and are stable and persisting.”

41

It is m a n i 

fested through the existence of groups such as labor u n 
ions and political parties which can operate to "minimize
violent economically-based conflict."

42

This conflict

reducing effect is based on two psychological p r o c e s s e s :
One is that the existence of such structures increases
m e n ’s value opportunities, i.e., their repertory of
alternative ways to attain value satisfaction.
A
complementary function is that of displacement:
la
bor unions, political parties, and a range of other
associations may provide the discontented with routinized and typically non-violent means for expres
sing their d i s c o n t e n t s . ^
Facilitation represents social and environmental condi
tions that may "facilitate the outbreak and existence of
strife."

44

Gurr operationalizes facilitation by m ea su r e

ments of "past levels of civil strife," and "social and
structural facilitation per s e ."

I b i d . , p. 1105

42T,
Ibid.
43Ibid.

44Ibid., p. 1106.

The theoretical basis

35.
for the former is that ’’populations in which strife is
chronic tend to develop, by an interaction process,

a set

of beliefs justifying violent responses to deprivation.”

45

Social and structural facilitation correspond to organi
zational and physical environmental conditions which make
it easier for aggrieved parties to mount and sustain armed
attacks on the government.

Gurr uses the relative

strength of the Communist Party to measure the organiza
tional component of facilitation,

the idea being that il

legal parties such as the Communist Party "are more facilitative of strife because their membership is likely,
because of the exigencies of repression,
cated, better organized,
forms of conflict.”
able to exist,

46

to be more dedi

and committed to the more violent

Polities in which such parties are

therefore,

should be characterized by a

higher level of violence.

The structural component of

facilitation relates to the terrain and transportation
networks of a country.

Countries with rugged terrain and

poorly developed transportation systems provide rebels

46Ibid., p. 1114.
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with inaccessible strongholds from which they can sustain
an insurrection.

47

The final variable in the model, legiti ma cy , is
included on the assumption that people are more willing
to comply with the directives of a government, notw it h
standing the existence of deprivations,

if the government

is possessed of a certain moral rectitude.

To the extent

that a government is seen in this light the level of
strife should be lower for any given level of frustration
Gurr operationalizes legitimacy by measuring the extent
to which governmental institutions are "native" to the
society (i.e., not imposed by some foreign power as in
the case of a colonial r e g i m e ) , and the length of time
over which such institutions have survived intact without
substantial reform.

48

The dependent variable,

civil s t r i f e , is defined

as "all collective, nongovernmental attacks on persons or
property that occur within the boundaries of an autonomous or colonial political unit."
47

49

By "nongovernmental"

Ibid.

48I b i d . , p. 1115.
49

Ibi'd. , p. 1107.
This definition is similar to,
but not identical to the definition of "political

37.
Gurr means "acts by subjects and citizens who are not
employees or agents of the regime, as well as acts of
such employees or agents contrary to role norms,

such as

mutinies and coups d ' e t a t . " ^
Finally there is the deprivation variable.

It

has been considered last because it will be singled out
for close scrutiny.

As Figure 6 indicates, Gurr divides

it into short-term deprivation and persisting deprivation.
Persisting deprivation represents deprivation over the
long, but not very long run.

As Gurr introduces the

variable,

violence" given earlier.
It differs in that, on the basis
of the definition alone, it is not quite clear if Gurr is
talking about violence aimed at the political regime, or
some diffuse form of violence that happens to occur w i t h 
in the political borders of the regime.
However, the r e 
mainder of G u r r 1s study makes it clear that he is ref er 
ring to violence targeted to against the regime.
His in
clusion of legitimacy, for example, in the class of v a r i 
ables determining civil strife indicates this.
The cau
sal proposition associated with legitimacy is that, other
things.being equal, people will decide to engage or not
engage in violence according to the moral rectitude of
the regime.
This implies that the regime is already
marked off as the appropriate focal point of violence b e 
cause it is held responsible for deprivations.
The only
question is whether people will be willing to endure dep
rivations and forgo attacks on the regime in light of its
moral q ua l ities.

38.
In the very long run men's expectations about the
goods and conditions of life to which they are en
titled tend to adjust to what they are capable of a t 
taining.
In the shorter span, however, some groups
may persistently demand and expect values, such as
greater economic opportunity, political autonomy, or
freedom of religious expression that their societies
cannot provide.51
Since the indices used to measure persisting deprivation
as well as short-term deprivation will play a very large
part in our assessment of G u r r 's model,
produced here almost in full.

they will be r e 

Gurr measured persisting

deprivation in terms of the following f a c t o r s :
(1) Economic discrimination is defined as systematic
exclusion of social groups from higher economic value
positions on ascriptive bases.
For each polity the
proportion of population so discriminated against, if
any, was specified to the nearest .05, and the inten
sity of deprivation coded on a four point scale .
(2) Political discrimination is similarly defined in
terms of systematic limitation in form, norm, or p r a c 
tice of social groups' opportunities to participate
in political activities or to attain elite positions
on the basis of ascribed characteristics.
Proportion
ality and intensity scores were determined and com
bined in the same manner as economic discrimination
sco re s.
(3) Potential separatism was indexed by multiplying
the proportional size of historically-separatist r e 
gional or ethnic groups by a four-point intensity
measure.
(4) Dependence on private foreign c a p i t a l , indexed by
negative net factor payments abroad as a percentage

Ibid., p. 1109.
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of Gross Domestic Product in the late 1950's, is
assumed to be a chronic source of dissatisfaction in
an era characterized by economic nationalism.
The
greater the *porportion of national product that a c 
crues to foreign suppliers of goods or capital, the
greater the inferred intensity of deprivation . . .
(5) Religious cleavages are a chronic source of dep
rivation-inducing conflict.
The scale for intensity
of religious cleavage takes account both of number of
organized religious groups with two percent or more
of total population . . . and of the duration of
their coexistence, the greater that duration the less
the inferred intensity
(6) Lack of educational opportunity was indexed, in
proportionality terms only, by subtracting primary
plus secondary school enrollment ratios ca. 1960 from
100.
Education is so widely regarded as an essential
first step in individual socio-economic advancement
that one can infer deprivation among the uneducated,
and among the parents of children who cannot attend
school if not yet among the children themselves.^2
Justification for inclusion of the short-term dep
rivation was made in the following t e r m s :
Any sharp increase in peoples' expectations that is
unaccompanied by the perception of an increase in
value capabilities, or any abrupt limitation on what
they have or can hope to obtain, constitute relative
deprivation.
We inferred that short-term, relative
declines in system economic and political performance
were likely to be perceived as increased deprivation
for substantial numbers of people.^3
Short-term deprivation was measured in terms of the fol
lowing i nd ices:

52I bi d. , pp.

1109-1110.

53Ibid., p. 1110.
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(1) Short-term trends in trade value, 1957 compared
with 1950-57 : The percentage change of trade value,
exports + imports, for 1957-60 was compared with the
rate for 1950-57, and any relative decrease in the
later period was treated as an indicator of short
term deprivation .
(2) Short-term trends in trade value, 1960-63 compared
with 1 9 5 0 - 6 0 : Procedures identical with (1), above,
were used . . .
(3) Inflation 1960-63 compared with 1 9 5 8 - 6 1 : Data on
cost-of-living indices were scaled and combined in
such a way that the highest deprivation scores were
assigned to polities with substantial and worsening
inflation in the 1958-63 period .
(4) 1960-63 GNP growth rates compared with 1950's
growth r a t e : Economic growth rate data were scaled
so that polities having low rates in the 1950's and
even lower rated in the early 1960's received the
highest deprivation scores; those with moderate rates
in the 1 9 5 0 's but substantial relative decline in the
early 1 9 6 0 's received somewhat lower deprivation
scores; and those with a steady high, or moderate but
steadily increasing, rates received zero deprivation
sc or es .
(5) Adverse economic conditions 1 96 0 - 6 3 : . To supple
ment aggregate data indicators of economic depriva
tion, several summary news sources were searched for
evaluative statements about adverse internal economic
conditions such as crop failures, unemplo ym en t, e x 
port market slumps, drought, etc. .
(6) New restrictions on political participation and
representation by the regime were coded from the same
sources (as above) for the same y e a r s .

Ibid., p. 1111.

41.
Problems :

Relative Deprivation?

Using regression analysis Gurr constructed a cau
sal model made up of the variables presented above.

The

model was aimed at explaining strife levels in 114 coun
tries during the 1961-65 period.

On the basis of the r e 

sults of his analysis, presented in Figure 6, Gurr con
cluded that "the fundamental proposition that strife v a r 
ies directly in magnitude with the intensity of relative
deprivation is strongly supported .
variables,

"provide an R of .60 (R

basic proposition of this study,

2

."

= .36)."

pressive at first glance,

Hence,

"the

that relative deprivation

is a necessary precondition for strife,"
The question is, does it really?

The deprivation

55

remains intact.

Do Gurr's results,

im

clearly sustain his conclusion

that relative deprivation is a necessary condition for
strife?
Anticipating criticism, Gurr himself outlined the
basis on which his conclusions might be challenged:
(T)here is only one scientifically acceptable alter
native to regarding the results reported here as
strong . . . evidence for the psychological proposi
tions relating relative deprivation . . . to civil
violence.
That is to provide some reasonably

55Ibid., pp. 1122-1123.
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parsimonious, alternative explanations
or t e c h n i c a l ) . . . * °
The question becomes then,

(substantive

does a reasonably parsimonious

alternative explanation of G u r r 's results exist?

I would

argue that, owing to the manner in which Gurr used his in
ferential measures of deprivation,

it does;

that in light

of G u r r 1s procedures for measuring deprivation,

the kind

of simple misery model offered by Marx and Engels in early
writings is such an alternative.

The latter is an alter

native in the sense of being distinct from G u r r 1s thesis
because it defines deprivation in terms of sheer material
needs, making no reference to expectations.

For this

very reason the misery model has greater parsimony:

with

no reference to thwarted expectations recourse to
frustration-aggression theory--something Gurr spends a
good deal of time on--becomes unnecessary.
cially important,

And,

espe

it can be shown to be an alternative in

that it is consistent with the results Gurr cites in de 
fense of the relative deprivation thesis.
As a glance at G u r r 1s indices of deprivation will
show, Gurr did not measure relative deprivation--or at
least not directly measure it.

56Ibid., p. 1123.

Relative deprivation is a

43.
state of mind.

To measure it directly Gurr would have

needed surveys in which people were questioned about their
expectations,

and on whether they perceived a discrepancy

between their value expectations and value capabilities.
Instead Gurr relied on indirect or inferential measures.
That is, on the basis of direct measures of objective
levels of economic goods, political and religious free
dom,

e t c . , Gurr inferred that people would feel a sense

of deprivation relative to some unspecified and unmeasured
set of expectations.
openly,

Gurr, of course,

explicitly stating,

for example,

defining short-term deprivation,
short-term,

did this quite

that,

in the course of

"we inferred that

relative declines in system economic and p o l i 

tical performance were likely to be pe'rceived as increased
deprivation

. . .";

57

or,

in the case of one of his p e r 

sisting deprivation indices,

saying that,

reliance on foreign capital,

"the greater the inferred

intensity of deprivation"

58

the greater the

(emphasis a d d e d ) .

does it with full awareness, noting that,

Also he

"the results

are not a ’d i r e c t 1 test of the relevance of such

57Ibid., p. 1110.
58Ibid.
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variables,

since the indices of psychological variables

are derived from aggregate data rather than being obtained .

59
from cross-national surveys.’1

And in itself,

his use of inferential measures cannot be condemned.

In

ferential measures are quite common in social science r e 
search,

and they are quite legitimate' according to the

canons of scientific methodology as laid out in standard
texts on the subject.

60

However,

the manner in which

Gurr used inferential measures in this particular case
made his results inconclusive.
Rather than designing indicators to reflect the
three patterns of relative deprivation presented earlier-the aspirational, progressive, and decremental patterns,
Gurr chose instead to use indices apparently intended to
capture no pattern in particular.

There is no mention

anywhere of these three patterns.

If the indices reflect

a particular pattern it would have to be the decremental
pattern.

The persisting deprivation indicators seem to

measure long-term declines;

the short-term,

short-term

59I b i d . , p. 1123.
See, for example, A dam Przeworski and Henry
T e u n e , The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New Y o r k :
John Wiley & Sons, 1970), pp. 97-106.
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declines.

This is unfortunate because the decremental

pattern comes closes.t to the very model we have identified
as an alternative to the relative deprivation model--the
misery model.

As a consequence,

legitimate questions

arise that weaken G u r r ’s conclusion.
sure?

What did Gurr m e a 

Did he measure relative deprivation,

or can his

measures be regarded with equal validity as measures of
absolute deprivation--!.e ., misery?
I would argue that they can.
distinct explanations,

Without survey data,

Ultimately then, we have two

each consistent with G u r r 's r e 

sults, and those results,

therefore,

are theoretically

inconclusive.
This problem need not have arisen because it does
not stem directly from the use of inferential measures.
If Gurr had stuck to inferential measures but employed
them in such a way as to reflect particular patterns of
development of deprivation,

he might have avoided the in

conclusiveness that plagues his results.

Even without

direct attitude surveys to corroborate states of mind,
* the progressive and aspirational patterns possess proper- *
ties that distinguish them from-the misery model.

The

progressive pattern consists in part of a steady rise in
value capabilities.

Certainly in the case of objectively

46.
measureable variables such as cost of living,
educational attainments,
aggregate data.

etc.,

The unchanged,

income,

this can be measured with
horizontal level of capa

bilities associated with the aspirational pattern can be
similarly measured.

In each case they can easily be dis 

tinguished from the misery pattern of progressive decline
solely on the basis of aggregate indices of empirical
phenomena.
Gurr may have failed to distinguish between p a t 
terns because,

as of the 1968 study, he had not yet d e 

veloped the scheme of three distinguishable ways in which
relative deprivation c o u l d •d e v e l o p .

The latter was p r e 

sented in Why Men R e b e l , written in 1970.

Or, even if

these schemes had taken shape by 1968, he may not have
wanted to use it because it would have entailed subdivid
ing his 114 nation sample into three separate categor ie s.
Much more research on each country would have been n e c e s 
sary to do this.

Also,

in the event one or two of the

categories contained only a few countries,

reduced sample

sizes might have made it difficult to establish statisti
cal significance.

But, whatever his reasons, working only

with indices of some type of general deprivation--which
in fact ended up looking like decremental deprivation,

47.
made Gurr's results inconclusive.

Consequently,

the

relative deprivation thesis has yet to receive strong and
clear empirical support.

Summary and Conclusions
The foregoing remarks have been made not so much
to criticize Gurr, as to establish the framework for the
present study.

The question posed at the outset of this

chapter unfortunately still remains an open one:

Does

political violence spring from the abject misery of p h y s 
ical environments as men, pushed to the precipice of sub
sistence,

lash out at authorities; or,

is it born in the

/

gaps men see between expectations and attai nm e nt s; less
an affair of external, material need than internal, p s y 
chological wants?

Gurr fell far short of providing a

clear and convincing answer.

.The means he used to measure

deprivation made it difficult to distinguish between rela
tive wants and sheer desperation.
What is needed,

therefore,

are studies in which

the specific pattern of relative deprivation is estab
lished for each individual case.

At least in cases in

which objectively measureable material conditions either
remained static or improved,

tests of statistical models

48.
built around these patterns should furnish a good basis
for deciding between the relative deprivation and misery
theses— even without direct psychological measures.
The present study is designed to meet this need.
The United States has been selected as a setting for
testing a single relative deprivation model.

During the

years from 1964 to 1968 a wave of rioting broke out in
black urban ghettos in cities throughout the United
States.

What I propose to do is investigate conditions

prior to the rioting to establish which of the three r e l 
ative deprivation patterns best characterizes the growth
of black discontent.

A regression model appropriate for

this pattern will then be constructed and tested.

The

hope is that by proceeding on a case-by-case basis fur
ther light can be shed on the genesis of political
violence.

CHAPTER II

GHETTO TURMOIL IN THE UNITED STATES

Throughout the night of July 22, 1967 reports of
sniper fire had been pouring into the Detroit police h e ad 
quarters.

A short distance from headquarters Mrs. Helen

Hall was staying at the Harlan House Hotel.

Her curio

sity having been aroused by noises outside,

she peered

through a hall window on the fourth floor.

’’Look at the

tanks," she called out to the other guests.
ter,

she died as

.50 caliber bullets from those tanks b e 

gan slamming into the building.'*'
George,

Seconds la

Around midnight Sharon

a 23 year old white woman, was a passenger in a

car along with her husband and two brothers.

They drop

ped off two Negro friends and then started returning
home.

Their automobile was soon slowed by a crowd m i l l 

ing in the street.

A shot fired at close range struck

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disor
ders (Kerner Co mm ission), Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam Books,
I n c ., 1968), p . 102.
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the car.
Newark,

Sharon Goerge died within two hours.

2

In

at about eight o'clock on the night of July 12,

1967, Mrs. L. M . , her husband,

their five sons, and Mr.

M's brother were returning home from dinner in a restau
rant.

Mr. M . , who was driving, panicked as he approached

a National Guard roadblock.
swerved around.

He slowed the car, then

A shot rang out.

When they reached home

the family began piling out of the car.
failed to move.

Ten year Eddie

He had died from a bullet wound in the

h e a d .^
•These incidents are but three pieces of a recur
ring nightmare that haunted America during the I960's.
From 1964 to 1968, on some 300 to 400 different occasions,
violence by blacks in cities across the country shattered
what remained of the myth of black contentment.

The first

question is, what happened?

Roman Holiday or Revolution?
Some said not much happened; not really.

The

riots did not have to be taken too seriously because they
did not amount to a serious social protest,

2I b i d .

Ibid., p . 94.

an attempt to
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challenge the legitimacy of existing institutions.
was the thesis advanced by the McCone Commission,

This

a group

of civic and business leaders appointed by Governor Brown
of California to investigate the Watts riots in 1964.^
David Sears and John McConahay summarize the findings of
that commission as f o l T o w s :
After (1) labeling the riot an 'insensate rage of de
struction, 1 the commission proposed that (2) partici
pants were a small fraction of the ghetto (2 percent
or 10,000 persons) who were marginally related to the
ghetto community, as drifters (principally criminals),
unemployed, and dropouts from the educational system,
and that (3) participants were newcomers to Los A n 
geles from the South who had been attracted by Cali
fornia 's liberal welfare policies and who turned to
violence when the expectations they brought with them
were not fulfilled.
If this is true,

if the participants were no more

than "a senseless mob, riffraff," or freeloading southern
newcomers,

then the riots were devoid of any political

significance.

They could be relegated to the status of

Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots
(McCone Commission), Violence in the city--an end or a
beginning?
(Los Angeles:
1965).
^David 0. Sears and John B. McConahay, The P o l i 
tics of Violence:
The New Urban- Blacks and the Watts
Riot (Boston:
The Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), p.
19.
See also Governor's Commission, Violence in the
c i t y , pp. 1, 4-6, 24, and 71.
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the ’’irrational and pathological” ;

a "Roman Holiday” of

violence that provided some sort of'emotional release.^
And the problems they represented,

"were not the collec

tive problems of a large black community living in a p r e 
dominantly white society riddled with racism;

they were

merely the individual peculiarities of a few deviant and

g
uncivilized troublemakers.”
This point is important as it is central to the
purposes of the study.

If we are dealing with the p at ho 

logical disorders of a small number of deviant individu
als,

then it is pointless to use the riots to test a the

ory purporting to explain civil unrest in terms of general
social conditions.

In this case the riots are best left

to the clinical psychologists or criminologists.
other hand,

On the

if the riots were perpetrated by a fair n u m 

ber of average citizens whose conduct grew out of

Sears and McConahay, The Politics of V i o l e n c e ,
p. 19.
^Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowen, ’’Civil V i o 
lence:
A Theoretical Overview,” in Riots and Re be l l i o n ,
ed. by Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowen (Beverly Hills,
Calif.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1968), p. 16.
g

Sears and McConahay, The Politics of V i o l e n c e ,

p. 19.
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grievances related to the social circumstances in which
they lived,

then a study of these circumstances makes

s en se .
It might be pointed out that Gurr considers riots
in general as manisfestations of political unrest.

They

are placed into one of three broad categories of political
violence,

"turmoil,11 "conspiracy," and "internal war."

"Turmoil," is defined as "relatively spontaneous, u n o r 
ganized political violence with substantial popular p a r 
ticipation,

including violent political strikes, riots,

political clashes,

and localized rebellions."

9

And it is

clear throughout his book that he regards the ghetto riots
in the United States in particular as appropriate objects
for explanation by his theory of political v i o l e n c e . ^

9

Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.:
• Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 11.
Gurr defines
."conspiracy" as "highly organized political violence with
limited participation, including organized political a s 
sassinations, small-scale terrorism, small-scale guerilla
wars, coups d'etat, and mutinies." "Internal war" is d e 
fined as "highly organized political violence with w i d e 
spread popular participation, designed to overthrow the
regime or dissolve the state and accompanied by extensive
violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerilla
wars, civil wars, and revolutions."

226-227,

10I b i d . , pp.
and 290.

99, 167, 169,

172-173,

183-184, 197,
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However,

Gurr makes no systematic attempt to justify his

treatment;

that is, to take up the specific question of

whether U.S. ghetto riots are political violence and dem
onstrate that they meet his own criteria of being
lective violence
bers of people,

(1) col

(i.e., violence by relatively large n u m 
and (2) a political form of collective

violence by reason of striking against the political r e 
gime in some way.
point,

So in light of G u r r 's ambiguity on this

as well as the "riffraff theory" offfered by the

McCone Commission,

the question of whether the riots were

the pathological outbursts of a few social misfits or
genuine political phenomena should be taken up.
Evidence gathered from various sources may be
seen* to support the political interpretation.

The Kerner

Commission found that 11 percent of the riot area resi
dents in Detroit and 45 percent of ghetto inhabitants in
Newark were self-reported rioters, which diminishes our
confidence in the argument that only a miniscule portion
of those communities took part.

11

Similarly,

a survey

conducted by T. M. Tomlinson and David Sears disclosed
that 15 percent of the curfew area residents in Los

11

Kerner Commission,

Report of D i s o r d e r s , p. 7.
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Angeles participated in the Watts riot.
from actual participation,

Moreover,

apart

the same authors found that

the conduct of the rioters was not inconsistent with the
sentiment of a larger segment of the community that did
not take part in the riot.

They report that 30 percent

selected "very or somewhat favorable" to describe their
feelings toward the rioters,

19 percent "ambivalent or

neutral," and 42 percent "strongly or moderately
unfavo ra bl e."

12

Nor does it appear that the rioters were itiner
ant drifters and trouble-makers from outside the region.
A survey by the Kerner Commission found that 74.4 percent
of the rioters in Detroit and 74 percent of those in
Newark were brought up in the North.

Further,

data gath

ered by the commission on five cities which experienced
riots revealed that 63 percent of the arrestees were born
in the same region in which the riot took place.

The com

mission summed up its views on this question by pointing
out that,

"Rioters are not only more likely than the n o n 

involved to have been born in the North, but they are

12

T. M. Tomlinson and David 0. Sears, "Riot Ide
ology in Los Angeles:
A Study of Negro Attitudes," in
Black R e v o l t , ed. by James A. Geschwender (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Pr en tice-Hall, Inc., p. 375.
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also more likely to have been long-term residents of the
city in which the disturbance took place."
The rioters themselves*, then,

13

do not appear to

have been negligible in number nor atypical of their com
munities.

To the extent that the McCone Commission thesis

hangs on demonstrating that they were,
ed.

it must be reject

But can one go so far as to say the riots were a

form of political violence?

Two analysts of the riots,

Louis Masotti and Don Bowen, approach this issue in a
fashion similar to Gurr.

They argue that determining the

nature of the riots comes down to a matter of intended
targets.

What distinguishes political violence from o t h 

er types of violence,
activity,

such as family feuding and criminal

"is the intent of those engaged in it to strike

out at the animate or inanimate representatives of the
civil order.

Such intent may be directely expressed by

the participants themselves,
tions by the observers."

or inferred from their ac-

14

Applying Masotti and B o w e n ’s standard of ’ex
pressed or inferred intent'
13

to the riots, we find that

Kerner Commission,

Report on D is or d e r s , pp.

Masotti and Bowen,

"Civil Violence," p. 13.

131.
14

130-
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the statements and actions of a sizeable segment of
blacks sustain a view of riots as political phenomena.

A

Kerner Commission survey of blacks in 15 American cities
found over half of those interviewed viewed the riots as
predominantly protests

(see Table 1).

Around a fourth

saw them as at least partly protest in nature.

These r e 

sults square with the findings of Tomlinson and Sears who
interviewed both blacks arrested in the course of the
Watts riot in Los Angeles and blacks who were not arrested
but who resided in the riot area.

(The Kerner Commission

sample was not drawn from Los Angeles.)

When asked to

choose the term best characterizing the riot,

38 percent

of the curfew area residents chose "revolt,11 "revolution,"
or "insurrection," as did 45 percent of those arrested.

15

One might argue that people tend to read meaning into
past actions that had little or no meaning at the time'
they were performed.

However,

Tomlinson and Sears found

that the respondents were able to single out specific
problems they felt were behind the riots:

38 percent of

the curfew zone residents and 51 percent of those arrested
cited particular grievances,

15

including "discrimination

Tomlinson and Sears,

"Riot Ideology," p. 384.

58.

TABLE 1
CHARACTER OF THE RIOTS

Blacks
Responses
Men

Women

Mainly protest

56%

59%

Mainly looting

9

10

30

25

5

6

50/50 mixture
D o n ’t know
Total
Source:

100%

100%

National Advisory Commission on Civil D i s 
orders (Kerner C om mi ss io n) , Supplemental
Studies for the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 4 7 ^

The 15 cities in the Kerner Commission survey
were Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland,
Detroit, Gary, Milwaukee, Newark, New York (Brooklyn
only), Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Francisco,
St. Louis, and Washington, D.C.
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and mistreatment by whites"
residents,

(7 percent of curfew area

4 percent of arrestees);

deprivation,

inadequate services"

cent) ; "police mistreatment"
and "pent-up hostility,

"poverty,

(10 percent and 5 p e r 

(21 percent and 42 p e r c e n t ) ;

desire for revenge,

percent and 34 p e r c e n t ) .^

economic

fed up"

As Table 2 indicates,

(26

the

Kerner Commission's 15-city survey revealed a similar
propensity by blacks to focus on specific socio-economic
g ri ev an ce s.
Masotti and Bowen point to the actions of the
rioters as their basis for saying that the riots were p o 
litical in character.

The rioters,

they note, were very

selective in their choice of targets.
were singled out for attack,

White policemen

and white-owned stores looted

and burned while the property of blacks often went untouched.

18

statement,

They cite no hard evidence to back up this
but it is consistent with what the Kerner Co m

mission found.

While cautioning against oversimplified

profiles of the "typical" riot,

the commission neve rt he 

less felt safe in drawing certain general conclusions

18

Masotti and Bowen,

"Civil Violence," p. 13.
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TABLE 2
GRIEVANCES BEHIND THE RIOTS
Blacks
Grievances
Men
Discrimination,
fair treatment

Women

un
49%a

48%

Unemployment

23

22

Inferior jobs

13

10

Bad housing

23

20

Poor education

10

9

Poverty

10

8

Police brutality

10

4

4

5

11

11

0

0

Black power or
other radicals
Looters and other
undesireables
Communists
Total

1537.

127%

Percentages do not sum to 100 since some people
mentioned more than one grievance.
Source:

National Advisory Commission on Civil D i s 
orders (Kerner Commission), Supplemental
Studies for the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders (New York:
Frederick A.
Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 48.
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about the 1967 disturbances.

One of them was that,

"The

civil disorders of 1967 involved Negroes acting against
local symbols of white American society,
property in Negro neighborhoods

. ."

19

authority and
In support of

this conclusion the commission stated that,
White-owned businesses are widely believed to have
been damaged much more frequently than those owned
by Negroes.
In at least nine of the cities studied,
the damage seems to have been, at least in part, the
result of deliberate attacks on white-owned b u s i 
nesses characterized in the Negro community as unfair
or disrespectful toward Negroes.^0
In answer,

then,

to the question posed at the out

set, what appears to have happened in these years of tu r
moil was something more than a mindless campaign of w a n 
ton

destruction launched by a handful of social misfits.

If the riots did not add

up to a full-scale revolution,

they did have a distinctly political character and shared
with revolutions the objective of violently striking out
at the civil order.

They do, in short,

of political violence.

qualify as a form

The next question is, what caused

them?

19
p.

The Kerner Commission, Report of D i s o r d e r s ,

6.

20

Ibid., p. 116.
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The remainder of this chapter will center around
the question of which of the three forms of relative dep
rivation presented in Chapter I would have been most
likely to have developed among blacks in the years prior
to the riots.

In the next section we will examine social

and economic changes which would seem to have played a
role in shaping the attitudes of b l a c k s .

Following t h i s ,

a theory will be offered on how each of these changes in
teracted to produce a sense of relative deprivation among
blacks.

Then we will examine a number of surveys on what

blacks thought about several issues relating to their
struggle for equality and to the riots.

The goal there

will not be to test the theory just formulated--that task
is reserved for the statistical analysis in the final
chapter, but to establish some initial plausibility for
it, to see if it is worth testing.

In the final part of

4

the chapter a number of propositions will be offered on
the realtionship between relative deprivation and ghetto
rioting,

as well as on the relationships between the riots

and other variables suggested by G u r r 1s theory to be im
portant in explaining political violence.

63.
The Gathering Storm
Obviously the ultimate answer to the question of
what caused the riots is that black hostility was the p r o 
duct of centuries of ill-treatment at the hands of whites.
What I am looking for, however,

are the developments that

more immediately preceded the riots.

Since blacks had

suffered discrimination since the civil war but had never
initiated violence on the scale of the riots in the
1960's, one suspects that something must have changed in
the decade or so before the riots.
mine what that something was,
ing G u r r 1s theory,

The task is to deter

and, for purposes of test

to do so in terms of a relative depri

vation framework.
In the years prior to the riots three developments
would seem to have been very important in determining the
orientation of blacks toward white society.

First,

if

blacks took themselves as their point of reference, r el a
tive to what they had experienced in the past things
seemed to be getting better.

While one would hesitate to

paint a picture of dramatic improvement in every facet of
black life, progress was being made in the two key areas
of education and income.

Sears and McConahay note that,

"post-World War II increases in black educational attain
ments are astounding.

In 1940, black men aged 25-29

64.
averaged 6.5 years of education.

21
was 11.0.11
income.

By 1962, the average

Table 3 charts a parallel growth in black

These facts would indicate that the black rebel

lion of the sixties was in some respects an affair of
hope;

that its roots are to be found in the heights of

shattered dreams rather than the depths of despair.
However, while the above advances may have given
blacks reason for optimism,
trend paralleled it.

a second,

less favorable,

If, on the one hand,

the lot of

blacks was improving relative to what it had been in the
past,

on the other hand, relative to whites things were

getting worse.

Based on compilations of data by the D e 

partments of Labor and Commerce,
noted,
whites.

the Kerner Commission

"Negro incomes still remain far below those of
Negro median family income was only 5870 of white

median income of 1966."

22

Moreover,

Although it is growing, Negro family income is not
keeping pace with white family income growth.
In
constant 1965 dollars, median nonwhite income in

21

Sears and McConahay,

The Politics of V i o l e n c e ,

p. 37.

22
p. 251.

The Kerner Commission, Report on D i s o r d e r s ,

65.

TABLE 3
BLACK INCOME,

1947-1966

Percentage of Black Families
Group
1947
$7,000 and over

7%

1960

1966

17%a

28%a

$3,000 to $6,999

29

40

41

Under $3,000

65

44

32

100%

101%

101%

Total
SL

Although no explanation is offered in the com
mission report as to why the percentages do not sum to
100, it is presumably due to the rounding off of decimal
places.
Source:

The National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders (Kerner C om mission), Report of the
National Advisory Commission on Civil D i s 
orders (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968),
p. 252.
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1947 was $2,174 lower than median white income.
1966, the gap had grown to $3 ,0 3 6 . ^

By

This growing white-black gap was not manifest in
education.

Sears and McConahay observed that,

"The r a 

cial differential has not been eliminated but it has been
reduced.

In 1940, whites had, on the average,

4.0 more

years of education than blacks; by 1962, the difference
was only 1.5 years
Davies,

(12.5 versus 11.0)."

24

along with Sears and McConahay,

However,

learned that if

one focuses on the differences in the capacities of blacks
to translate education into income as compared to whites,
here again we find blacks losing ground.

Davies,

after

comparing the income of whites and blacks per year of e d 
ucation,

concluded that,

(N)onwhites were closest to earning the same amount
as the total population in 1952.
They rose from 58
percent in 1940 to 86 percent in 1952, but declined
to a low of 747, in 1962.
They did not return to their
relative status of 1940, but they lost substantial
ground compared with where they were in 1 9 5 2 . ^
23
24

Ibid.
Sears and McConahay, The Politics of V i o l e n c e ,

p. 37.
25

James C. Davies, "The J Curve of Rising Expecta
tions and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great
Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Violence in
A m e r i c a , ed. by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (New
York: The New American Library, 1969), pp. 701-702.
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Besides overall decline over timfe, Sears and McConahay
learned that b l a c k s ' ability to get a financial return on
their education diminished relative to whites as one went
up the education ladder:
In 1966, the white person with a grade school educa
tion had a median income that was $1,099 above that
of the black person with a comparable education.
As
education increased, the advantage of whites in
creased, so that the difference between the races was
$3,095 for people with a college degree.^6
Thus, blacks could not look to higher education as a means
of closing the gap w ith whites.

If blacks measured their

progress in terms of position relative to whites,

then,

there would seem to have been ample cause for despair.
The third development was the civil right m o v e 
ment of the 1 9 6 0 ’s.

In some form or another,

of course,

agitation for black equality had been going on since the
civil war.

The most prominent institution of the pre-'

1 9 6 0 ’s campaign was the NAACP

(National Association For

The Advancement Of Colored People).

The N A A C P ’s challenge

to discrimination took place most notably in the courts,
the crowning achievement of that approach coming in 1954
with the Supreme C o u r t ’s landmark Brown v. Board of

26
Sears and McConahay, The Politics of V i o l e n c e ,
p. 51.
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Education decision that outlawed segregation in southern
public schools.

As significant as this and other legal

decisions were to be in their long-range effects,

they

were eclipsed by the far more visible and dramatic drives
for equality that made up the social movement we have
come to know as the civil rights movement.

The latter

was a nonviolent but physical assault on white institu
tions that took the struggle for black dignity out of the
hushed chambers of the n a t i o n ’s courts and put it into
the arena of America's streets.

It began to rear its

head in the boycotts of white businesses in Montgomery
in 1955 and Tuskgegee in 1957, and gathered momentum in
the late 1 9 5 0 's and early 1 9 6 0 's with student sit-ins and
freedom rides.

By the time President Kennedy fell to an

assassin's bullet in 1963 a full-blown movement was under
way,

complete with national organizations such as CORE

(Congress For Racial Equality ) , SNCC

(Student Nonviolent

Coordinating C o m mi tt ee ) , and the SCLC

(Southern Christian

Leadership Conference)

to give it structure,

and leaders

such as Martin Luther King to give it inspiration.

While

these organizations and their leaders differed in many
w a y s , their programs shared the common element of a
demand--not a request, but a demand for equality with

with whites.

And the demand was to be met not at some

point in the distant future, but

'NOW!'

I would argue that the gains blacks made in the
1950's,

the growing gulf between them and whites,

and the

civil rights movement were the clouds of a gathering
storm that first struck in midsummer of 1964 when riots
convulsed the Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant sections of
New York City.

What remains is to see just exactly how

they joined together to produce that storm.

A Relative Deprivation Theory of
Black Discontent
The growth of black incomes and education during
the 1950's had two effects.
isfying in itself.

Second,

room for improvement,
further progress.

First,

it was obviously sat

since there was still much

it generated expectations of still

If matters had continued on this track,

contentment, not violence, would have been the eventual
outcome.

The expectations spawned by recent gains would

be met by new improvements as levels of black income and
education kept on rising.

This would have been the case,'

that is, if blacks had continued to use themselves as
their point of reference.

I would suggest that they did

70,
not, however,

and this is where the civil rights m o v e 

ment comes in.
The civil rights movement,

aided and abetted by

the federal government during the Kennedy and Johnson a d 
ministrations,

effected a redefinition of the standards

by which blacks measured progress in their daily lives.
It changed the standard from improvement relative to the
black past to equality relative to the white present.
Whites became the point of reference.

Once this took

place the mood of blacks changed from hopeful optimism to
bitter frustration and resentment as blacks took stock of
the growing gap between them and whites.
blacks saw,

The America

the white America, was marked not only by the

absence of widespread poverty, but by conspicuous con
sumption.

It had become,

according to John Kenneth

Galbraith,

the "affluent society";

a nation so rich that

the "conventional w i s d o m ” of getting more wealth had to
be abandoned for a new philosophy on what to do with the
considerable wealth it already had.

27

Much of the frustration and violence might have
been avoided if the message of equality had spread
27

.
John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society
(New York: Mentor Books, 1958), pp. 13-17ff.
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slowly; or if escape from the ghetto had come quickly.
However,

on both scores time was on the side of turmoil.

The tactics of the civil rights movement all but ruled
out a gradual black awakening.

Sit-ins and mass marches

invite dramatic and immediate confrontation, not quiet,
drawn-out accommodation.

And the lack of skills among

blacks placed an upper limit on how fast they could rise
in technocratic America--to say nothing of the problem of
white racism that defied swift resolution.
The above developments are graphically represented
in Figure 8.

The model depicted in Figure 8 is a modified

version of Gurr's progressive deprivation model.

It

shares with Gurr's original model the elements of rising
value expectations and value capabilities.

The two dif

fer in that in the Gurr model the sharp descrepancy b e 
tween expectations and capabilities stems from a decline
in capabilities.

In the modified model presented below,

it came about through a change in the nature of those ex
pectations as blacks suddenly took whites as their point
of reference.

Given the superior status enjoyed by whites

this meant a sharp rise in expectations which,

in turn,

produced a large discrepancy between black value expec
tations and capabilities.

Expectations of progress in
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Fig. 8.--Modified Progressive Deprivation
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the 1 9 5 0 ’s were thus frustrated not by a reversal of that
progress but by a change in the standards against which
it was measured.
It should be noted that no attempt ha,s been made
to single out a particular event or set of events as
triggering feelings of frustration and anger among blacks.
This is in contrast to Davies who argues that such feel
ings could be traced to attacks on civil rights demonstra
tors in the South in 1963.

According to Davies,

This increase in violence, commencing so to speak
with the firehoses and police dogs in May 1963 in
Birmingham, affronted not only the physical safety
of the demonstrators . . . This increase in violence
also affronted the dignity of black people as human
beings.
Black people sensed that their various and
continuously rising expectations, now confronted with
violence, were to rise no m o r e . 2**
Davies may be right,

and, beside attacks on demonstrators,

one could also point to the death of President Kennedy in
November of 1963 as another event that blacks viewed as a
setback.

Certainly Kennedy's dramatic nationwide televi

sion address in which he characterized civil rights as a
moral concern for all Americans, marked him as a champion
of the black cause.

However,

focusing on specific events

28
Davies, "The J Curve of Rising Expectations,"
p. 701.
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which may or may not have been decisive in some sense,
risky;

is

the risk being one of attributing to narrow events

outcomes produced by broad social processes for which
events were merely the catalysts.

To avoid this problem

the argument has been limited to saying that three de
velopments- -rising black living standards and expectations
in the 1950's, the increasingly large gap between blacks
and whites,

and rapid assimilation of the ethic of

equality--interacted in such"a wa y as to produce a sudden
awareness of their inferior position relative to whites-i.e.,

a sense of relative deprivation.

It is this sense

of relative deprivation that is being identified as the
motive for the riots,

leaving to speculation the exact

role played by individual events.
It follows that if no particular event is being
singled out,

the exact time cannot be fixed as to when

the perception of a gap between blacks and whites crys
tallized.

It has been set at 1963 because the civil

rights movement was getting into full swing in that year,
culminating with the March on Washington in August, but
that is just a rough guess.

It could have been earlier,

it could have been a little later.
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Supporting Evidence
The above theory on black discontent is just
that--a theory.

It is built around extrapolations from

aggregate data on black incomes and education to conclu
sions on the states of mind of blacks at points prior to
the riots.

In general terms this is similar to what Gurr

did in his 114 nation study discussed earlier.

Given the

considerable difficulty of interviewing, recourse to in
ference from aggregate data is quite understandable,

es

pecially in the case of a study such as Gurr's where in
terviewing means expensive cross-national interviewing.
In the present study the same problem exists.
the considerable time,

Because of

effort, and expense involved no a t 

tempt has been made to test Gurr's theory by means of
opinion s ur ve ys .

Instead,

a theory on black discontent

has been proposed that will be tested by statistical anal
ysis of aggregate data.

However, because a single coun

try has been selected as the setting for the research-and a wealthy,

industrial country at that--the problem is

not quite as severe.

In connection with the ghetto riots

as well as the civil rights problem in general,

a number

of polls were taken in the United States to tap the senr

timent of blacks on matters germane to the theory.

They

76.
consist of two nationwide polls done by Louis Harris and
Associates in 1963 and 1966,

and several smaller polls

conducted by the Kerner Commission in cities hard-hit by
the riots.

Not all the assumptions made in the theory

are covered by these polls.

Naturally,

they provide no

information on the assumption that blacks in the 1 9 5 0 ’s
measured progress against their past life styles.

Nor is

the implied phenomenon of a transition from one standard
to another in the 1960's tapped by the polls.
assumptions that are covered, namely,

And the

that blacks by 1963

were thinking in terms of equality with whites and that
they were not satisfied with the pace of progress toward
this goal,

are not supported directly with questions

framed in terms identical to them.

The polls do, however,

provide evidence that can be argued to be consistent with
these assumptions.
While no questions were asked on the specific
question of whether blacks wanted equality with whites,
it is fairly clear from the Harris survey in 1963 that
they did not want separatism.

Despite the attention in

the media gained by the Black M u s l i m s , their message of
separation between the races apparently fell on deaf ears
for a large number of blacks.

Only 6 percent of those

77.
polled said they approved of the Black Muslims,
cent said they disapproved,
were "not sure."

29

53 p e r 

and the remaining 41 percent

On questions relating to the mixing

of whites and blacks under various circumstances,

the

Harris poll revealed a striking endorsement by blacks of
integration over separatism.

Seventy-six percent of those

polled said they preferred working in a mixed group of
whites and blacks versus 11 percent who favored working
mostly with blacks.
ing.

30

A similar picture emerges in h ou s

Only 20 percent of the respondents favored living

in all-black neighborhoods, with 64 percent preferring to
have both whites and blacks as neighbors.

31

When asked,

"would you like to see all Negro children in your family
go to school with white children or not," 70 percent said
they w o u l d . ^

29

William Brink and Louis H a r r i s , Black and White
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 262.
The results
of both the 1963 and 1966 polls are reported in Black and
White.
30
31

I b i d ., p. 232.
Ibid.

32Ibid., p. 234.
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If one can make the assumption that a desire to
work,

live and have one's children attend school with

whites implies a desire to be equal to whites,

then these

results add up to a very strong endorsement of the goal
of equality as of 1963.
To the extent that we can assume blacks equated
advancement of negro rights with progress toward equal
ity, then the same Harris survey demonstrated that a
sizeable segment of blacks,

if not an overwhelming major-

ith, were impatient with the pace of progress toward
equality.

Fifty-one percent said they thought the cause

of Negro rights was moving "to slow";

for 31 percent it

was "about right," and 3 percent said it was "too fast."

33

Attitudes on equality have been singled out, of
course, because failure to achieve equality is held to
have been a major factor in causing the riots.
is the case,

If this

it would follow that those who took part in

the riots would be more sensitive to the civil rights
movement and discrimination than those who did not.
veys made by the Kerner Commission bear this out.
4 presents the results of a survey done in Newark

33Ibid., p. 258.

Sur 
Table
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TABLE 4
BLACK RIGHTS DISCUSSION
Frequency

Rioters

(106)

Nonrioters

Nearly everyday

53. 8%

Once a week

12.3

7.9

From time to time

31.1

52.4

Never

0.0

0.0

D o n 't know

2.8

4.8

Total
Source:

1007c

(126)

34. 97o

p < .025

1007c

National Advisory Commission on Civil
orders (Kerner Commission), Report of
National Advisory Commission on Civil
orders (New York: Bantam Books, I n c . ,
p. 178.

Dis
the
Dis 
1968),
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comparing rioters and nonrioters on how often they dis
cussed negro rights.
A second survey compared rioters and nonrioters
on what they thought were the main obstacles to employ
ment.

As Table 5 indicates,

rioters showed a greater

willingness to perceive discrimination as an obstacle to
employment than those who did not participate in the
Newark r i o t .
Obviously these polls fall short of being a good
test -of the theory of black discontent.

Their results

have been reported only to show that at least some of the
assumptions made on how blacks saw their lot in the 1960's
are not pure speculation.

The hope is to add some p l a u 

sibility to the theory by reducing--but certainly not
eliminating--reliance on sheer inference for state of
mind phenomena.

We can say that what hard evidence exists

on the states of mind of blacks is at least consistent
with what has been proposed in the theory.

Testable Implications
Of the two factors cited as responsible for black
discontent,

only two--expectations spawned by gains in

the 1950's and inequality with whites in the 1960's--will
be incorporated into a definition of relative deprivation.
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TABLE 5
PERCEIVED OBSTACLES TO EMPLOYMENT
Rioters

(71)

Nonrioters
41.2%

Lack of Training

18.3%

Lack of Experience

12.7

8.8

Discrimination

69.0

50.0

Total
Source:

100%

(88)

p < .025

100%

National Advisory Commission on Civil
orders (Kerner Commission), Report of
National Advisory Commission on Civil
orders (New York: Bantam Books, Inc. ,
p. 175.

Dis
the
Dis
1968) ,
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The third,

the impact of the civil rights movement, has

been omitted for want of suitable aggregate measures.
One that initially suggested itself,

frequency of civil

rights activity in a city, was dismissed because ga ther
ing data on it would have entailed a search of local n e w s 
papers for cities all across the country.

Only a few

such newspapers are on the subscription lists of academic
lib ra ri es .
Focusing on the other two factors,

then, relative

deprivation is defined as a combination of growth-induced
expectations and inequality with whites.

(For brevity,

the latter factor will be referred to as "discrimination.1')

Relative deprivation is expected to be greatest

in cities in which the black population experienced the
highest level of growth-induced expectations in the
1950's,

on the one hand, but, on the other hand,

suffered

the greatest amount of discrimination in the 1960's.

The

following proposition is offered on the relationship b e 
tween relative deprivation and the r i o t s :
*

Proposition 1:

There is a positive,

linear relationship

between relative deprivation and the magnitude of ghetto
riots.
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Mediating Variables
As pointed out earlier in the discussion of Gurr's
model, violence is not a foregone conclusion in each and
every case in which social discontent exists.

The ef

fect of other conditions must be taken into account in
assessing a person's willingness to resort to violence
as a means of redressing grievances.

‘Some of these con

ditions may have the effect of soothing anger by bringing
about a solution to underlying problems.
other hand,

Some, on the

are additional sources of irritation w h i c h - -

though of minor significance under most circumstances-take on great importance in conjunction with pre-existing
feelings of hostility.

Others will have the effect of

inhibiting the violent expression of discontent while
leaving root causes of these feelings untouched.

Finally,

some combine to create a social environment that promotes
or lends support to the use of violence.

In this section

of the study the task is to identify a few of those m e d i 
ating variables that appear to have had a significant im
pact on blacks in making their decision to riot.

Three

broad types of mediating conditions will be considered:
social control variables,

social facilitation variables,

and government capabilities.
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Social Control
Social control refers to the overall process
whereby a society seeks to limit undesireable behavior.
Governments adopt a variety of measures to control such
behavior,

including coercive force.

Recalling the discussion in chapter two, research
on political violence and coercive force used to control
such violence has shown the relationship between them to
be curvilinear:

Low to moderate levels of force serve

only to frustrate and anger people further and spur them
on to even greater violence, whereas, with large amounts
of force, fear begins to override anger to effect a r e 
duction of v i o l e n c e . ^
The chief instrument of coercive control involved
in the ghetto turmoil is the police,

and in this study an

attempt will be made to discover the relationship between
the size of city police departments and the magnitude of
the riots.

The following proposition is offered to de

scribe their relationship.

34

See p. 33 of this study.
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Proposition 2:

There is a positive,

linear relationship

between the size of city police departments and the m a g tude of ghetto r i o t s .
The assumed causal process involved in this r el a
tionship is that as the size of the police department in
creases,

the likelihood of hostile encounters between the

police and ghetto residents increases.

The encounters

may not be particularly violent or involve a large number
of persons.

However,

they tend to generate feelings of

hostility and frustration and further anger persons a l 
ready discontented over their social conditions.
or reprimands for vagrancy,

Arrests

disturbing the peace, or drunk

driving are three examples of this type of incident.

It

is not thought that police departments were of sufficient
size to deter rioters.

Hence,

a curvilinear pattern has

not been proposed.
A number of studies on black grievances support
this view of the police as a tension-generating agent.
Sears and McConahay found that 42 percent of the black
arrestees in Los Angeles cited police mistreatment as one
of the causes of the Watts riot.
35

p. 167.

35

A nationwide Gallup

Sears and McConahay, The Politics of V i o l e n c e ,
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poll in 1965 revealed that 35 percent of black males
believed there was police brutality in their areas versus
7 percent of white males who had the same opinion.

36

In

1964 the New York Times conducted a survey in Harlem which
showed that 43 percent of those interviewed thought there
was police brutality.

37

The Kerner Commission found that

this charge lacked a factual basis.
port that,

It stated in its r e 

"when police-citizen contacts are systematic

ally observed,

the vast majority are handled without a n 

tagonism or incident."

Its examination of 5,039 police-

citizen contacts turned up only 20--or three-tenths of 1
percent--cases of excessive force by the police.
ertheless,

the commission noted,

38

Nev

certain police practices

understandably generated a large number of irritating in
cidents to be later lumped by blacks under the broad p a n 
oply of "brutality."
These practices, sometimes known as "aggressive p r e 
ventive patrol," take a number of forms, but invari
ably they involve a large number of police-citizen
contacts initiated by police rather than in response
36

Cited in The Kerner Commission,
o r d e r s , p. 302.
37I b i d .
38Ibid.

Report on Pis
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to a call for help or service.
One such practice
utilizes a roving task force which moves into highcrime districts without prior notice, and conducts
intensive, often indiscriminate, street stops and
searches.
A number of persons who might legitimately
be described as suspicious are stopped.
But so also
are persons whom the beat patrolman would know are
respected members of the c o m m u n i t y . ^ 9

Facilitation
According to G u r r , the factors that faciliate p o 
litical violence consist of "past strife," and "social
and structural facilitation," the latter referring to
dissident organizations like the communist party

(social

facilitation) and physical aspects of a society,

such as

poorly developed transportation networks and rugged m o u n 
tainous regions,

that provide rebels with secure bases

(structural f a c i l i t a t i o n ) . ^
A direct application of Gurr's scheme to ghetto
riots is ruled out for three reasons.

First neither the

organizational nor the physical-environmental components
of 'social and structural facilitation'
the riots.

are relevant to

There is no indication whatsoever in any

~^I b i d . , p. 304.
40

Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil
Strife:
A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," A m e r 
ican Political Science R e v i e w , LXII (December 1968),
p. 1106.
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studies on the riots of their having been planned,
executed, or materially supported by organized parties,
groups,

cliques,

factions,

cabals,

etc.

The Kerner Com 

mission's conclusion on the riots of 1967 is typical:
On the basis of all the information collected the
Commission concludes that the urban disorders of the
summer of 1967 were not caused by, nor were they the
consequence of, any organized plan or "conspiracy."
Specifically, the Commission has found no evidence
that all or any of the disorders or the incidents
that led to them were planned or directed by any
organization or group, international, national or
l o c a l .^
Furthermore,

all the ghettos would rank about the

same on a scale of physical remoteness.
heart of the city,
lice.

Second,

is cumbersome.

Located in the

all were highly accessible to the p o 

G u r r ’s taxonomy of facilitating conditions
He makes an awkward distinction between

past strife and social and structural facilitation.

Past

strife is proposed as bearing on political violence by
way of fostering "beliefs justifying violent responses to
deprivation."^

Beliefs justifying violence are a social

phenomenon and should be classified as such.

41

The Kerner Commission, Report on D i s o r d e r s ,

p. 202.
42

Third, while

Gurr, "A Causal Model," p. 1106.
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the variable of past strife is relevant to the riots as
well as to political violence in general,

the reason Gurr

gives for why it i ^ relevant-- spawning a set of violencejustifying beliefs--is vague.

By ’justifying b e l i e f s ’,

does Gurr mean something on the order of an elaborate
ideology such as Marxism?
not.

Gurr seems to suggest he does

He says that these beliefs are an outgrowth of an

"interaction process," indicating an informal,

ad hoc line

of development with a loosely organized, uncodified,
perhaps,

and,

only tacitly expressed set of assumptions on v i 

olence as its end product.

However,

the matter is u l t i 

mately unclear.
In this study, past strife in the form of previous
riots is proposed as a social factor, which facilitated
subsequent riots in two ways.

First, previous riots w e a k 

ened normative constraints against violence.

Violence in

any society is a serious matter and very strong norms ex
ist against its use.

The power of these norms to restrain

behavior can be weakened in one of two ways.

First,

the

norms can be weakened if they are challenged in principle
as being wrong.

In the case of prohibitions against v i o 

lence this is not likely to happen.
agree that,

Most people will

in principle, violence is to be condemned.
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A survey on the attitudes of American men toward violence
disclosed that 97 percent of the respondents disapproved
43

of violence in principle.

The restraining power of so

cial norms can be weakened in a second way:
fact that they are violated.

by the mere

Matters ma y never develop

to the point where norms are challenged in the abstract,
but, because a number of persons have transgressed against
them,

it becomes much easier for others to conceive of

doing so themselves.

This is precisely the effect that I

believe previous riots to have had.

Nothing on the order

of a competing set of beliefs justifying violence arose
to displace old norms against it; rather,

the grip of

those norms was weakened by the deeds of others.

The

mere fact that some had rioted before loosened normative
constraints for others later.
Second,

apart from moral considerations, previous

riots facilitated later riots because riots were seen by
blacks as effective instruments for desired change.

They

eased the way for later riots by leading people to reason,
'right or wrong,

43

rioting works.'

A fair amount of survey

Monica D. Blumenthal, et a l . , Justifying V i o 
lence:
Attitudes of American Men (New York: Harper 6c Row,
Publishers, 1971), p. 23.
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data supports this assertion.

These surveys show that

the conviction that rioting helped the cause of blacks
existed among a substantial segment of the black communi
ty.

In Sears and M c C o n a h a y 's study of the Watts riot,

spondents were aksed,

re

"Do you think it [the Watts riot]

helped or hurt the Negro cause?"

As Table 6 shows,

even

among those not clearly marked off as rioters and whose
answers,

therefore,

could not be dismissed as rationaliza

tions of past behavior,
helped.

over a third felt the riots had

Also the replies of whites and Mexican-Americans

demonstrate that black sentiment was not merely part of
some self-evident platitude shared by the whole community.
But for the inclusion of these two comparison groups,

one

might be tempted to make this agrument since the Sears
and McConahay surveys were made after passage of the 1964
Civil Right Act.
Benjamin Singer's research in Detroit revealed
that while in 1964 only 2 percent of blacks felt the riots
had been beneficial, by 1969
express this view.

44

44

Finally,

40 percent were willing to
a study done for the Kerner

Benjamin D. Singer, "Mass Media and Communica
tion Processes as Factors in the Detroit Riot of 1967,"
in Black R e v o l t , p. 357.
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TABLE 6
EFFECTIVENESS OF WATTS RIOT
Black
Curfew
Zone

Black
Arrestees

Whites

Mexican
Americans

Helped

38%*

54%

19%

21%

No difference,
d o n 11 know

30

33

5

2

Hurt

24

.9

75

75

8

4

1

2

Responses

No a n s w e r ,
other
Total
Source:

100%

100%

100%

100%

David 0. Sears and John B. McConahay, The
Politics of Violence:
The New Urban Blacks
and the Watts Riot (Boston: The Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1973), p. 1 6 1 . ^

The Sears and McConahay surveys were done in
1965 and 1966.
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Commission report disclosed that over a third of the
respondents in the black sample, drawn from 15 American
cities,

felt the riots had done some good.

46

A follow-up

survey asking the same respondents why they thought the
riots had helped, revealed 1tangible gains'
most frequently cited reason

to be the

(see Table 7).

The following proposition is offered on the r el a
tionship between previous and later riots:

Proposition 3:

There is a positive,

linear relationship

between the magnitude of previous riots and the magnitude
of later r i o t s .

Governmental Capacity
Early in the chapter it was pointed out that
blacks were able to cite specific greivances including
general discrimination and socio-economic problems as
causes for the rioting
case,

(see pp.

58-60).

If this is the

it would follow that differences in the capacity of

city governments to deal w ith these grievances would have
a bearing on the amount of racial trouble the city
46

National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
Kerner Commission), Supplemental Studies for the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New Y o r k :
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 49.
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TABLE 7
WHY THE RIOTS HELPED
Blacks
Reasons
Men
Tangible gains
more jobs)

Women

(e.g.,

Whites understand
Black problems better
Show of Negro power

19%a

20%

14

10

9

5

SL

For brevity I have extracted only a part of a
larger table given in the study.
The percentages do not
sum to 100 because they represent only a portion of the
total sample covered in the original table.
Source:

National Advisory Commission on Civil D i s 
orders (Kerner Commission), Supplemental
Studies for the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 49.
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experiences.

Tangible evidence for this inference is

provided by a Kerner Commission survey,

in which blacks

were asked if there was anything their city government
could do to avoid a conflagration such as the one that
had racked Detroit.
ing majority

As Table 8 indicates,

(8270 for men,

74% for women)

the overwhelm
felt something

could be done to stave off a Detroit-like disturbance.
Only a very small minority felt nothing would help.

Pro

position 4 states the hypothesized relationship between
government capacity and rioting.

Proposition 4:

There is a negative,

linear relationship

between governmental capacity and the magnitude of r i o t s .
The variable of

'governmental c a p a c i t y 1 is based

on Gurr's variable of "institutionalization"--but only
loosely.

Gurr's explanation of how institutionalization

relates to political violence is confusing.

Institution

alization supposedly reduces violence, but just what is
involved in achieving .this effect is unclear.

In present

ing the concept Gurr explains institutionalization in 
volves societal structures which act to reduce violence
by

(a) providing nonviolent outlets for pent-up ho st il i

ties,

and (b) by providing alternative ways by which

those things of which people are deprived can be obtained.
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TABLE 8
CITY GOVERNMENT ACTION
Blacks
First Responses
Men

Women

Better employment

26%

24%

End discrimination

14

15

Better housing

8

8

Other social and economic
improvements

7

5

Better police treatment •

6

1

12

13

More black control of
institutions

0

0

More police control

9

8

Can't do anything, have
tried everything

3

5

15

21

100%

100%

Improve communications
between blacks and w h i t e s ;
show blacks whites care

D o n 't know
Total
Source:

National Advisory Commission on Civil D i s 
orders (Kerner Commi ss io n) , Supplemental
Studies for the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, Publishers, 1968), p. 48.
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The societal structures ostensibly performing both func
tions are, or appear to be, nongovernmental associations
such as political parties and labor unions.

In laying

out the concept Gurr makes no mention of what is normally
regarded as the g ov ernment--!.e ., some form of executive,
be it a monarch,

a president,

a dictator, or whatever;

or, a legislative body such as a parliament;
some type of bureaucracy.

or, perhaps,

The confusion comes about when

Gurr proceeds from defining institutionalization to p r e 
senting his operational measures of it.

In addition to

two expected indices of union membership and political
party stability, he presents one on the government:

"cen

tral government budget expenditures as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product."

47

Inclusion of this index on

the government appears to mean institutionalization in
volves an additional,

distinctly different type of social

structure from the two nongovermental ones Gurr first
mentioned,

and, with that new societal structure,

an a d 

ditional conflict-reducing function, of directly relieving
discontent through expenditure of government f u n d s .

While

G u r r ’s designation of the government and its services as

^Gurr,

"A Causal Model," p. 1*113.

98.
part of institutionalization may be perfectly valid,

the

haphazard way in which this is done leaves one wondering
about just what the concept means in Gurr's mind.
In light of this confusion, no attempt has been
made to apply Gurr's conceptually vague notion of insti
tutionalization to blacks.

Instead I have borrowed from

it by taking one of its suggested d i m e ns io ns :

the capa

city of the government to take action toward relieving
discontent.

Governmental capacity was selected because

it can be easily operationalized in terms of expenditures,
and because it rests on the straightforward thesis that
discontent can be neutralized by dealing with its causes-and expending money is an effective means of dealing with
these causes.
Labor union activity was not selected because it
is questionable whether blacks in the United States r e 
gard unions as effective groups for dealing with their
problems.

A nationwide Harris poll in 1963 found that

only 38 percent of blacks were willing to rate unions as
"more helpful" in advancing the cause of blacks, with 25
percent feeling they were "more harmful," and 37 percent
saying they were "not sure."

When the Harris sample was

subdivided according to income,

a full 50 percent of the

99.
low income groups said they were more harmful, with 19
percent not being sure and only 31 percent willing to regard them as more helpful.
if not hostility,

48

Presumably this ambivalence,

stems from charges that many unions,

particularly in the skilled trades,
blacks.

discriminate against

I will not go into whether this is the real re a

son or whether these charges are well-founded, because
these questions are not relevant for my purposes.

What

is relevant is that a majority of .blacks did not view
unions as effective instruments for improving their so
cial conditions.

This precludes regarding unions as con

flict-reducing agents.
As for the other facet of institutionalization,
political parties,

a search of a number of sources,

cluding census data,

in

failed to turn up any reliable a g 

gregate measure that would allow me to relate political
parties to the rioting.

Affiliation to American parties

is most systematically measured in registration and v o t 
ing totals.

Neither of these was reported on a city-by-

city basis for b l a c k s .

^ B r i n k and Harris, ‘Black and W h i t e , p. 234.
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Legitimacy
The variable of legitimacy,

included in Gurr's

model, was not included in the present study for want of
an aggregate measure of it.

One plausible one that came

to mind, voting turn out for blacks,

could not be used

for the reason just cited above.

Summary
In this chapter a model has been developed to ac
count for why blacks in the United States rioted.
iant of Gurr's

'progressive deprivation'

A var

syndrome was se

lected as the best characterization for how initial dis
content developed.

The heart of ,the modified progressive

deprivation model presented is the proposition that a r e 
definition of standards brought on by the civil rights
movement was responsible for initial discontent.

Several

factors thought to have interacted w ith that discontent,
either by way of translating it into violence or by r e 
ducing it, were then introduced.

What remains is to o p 

erationalize the model by defining suitable aggregate
measures of its components,

and then to test it.

CHAPTER III

MEASUREMENT AND TESTING

In the previous chapter four separate relation
ships have been proposed between the magnitude of the
ghetto riots,

the dependent variable,

and the independent

variables of relative deprivation, police department size,
the magnitude of previous riots,
city.

and governmental capa

In the cases of relative deprivation, police d e 

partment size, and previous riots the relationships are
asserted to be positive, meaning the greater the level of
each one of these variables,
the riots.

the greater the magnitude of

In the case of governmental capacity the r e 

lationship between it and the mangitude of the riots is
posited as negative, with increases in governmental c a 
pacity associated with decreases in the magnitude of the
riots.
In this chapter,
will be tested.

each of the above propositions

This will entail developing numerical

indices for each of the v a r i a b l e s , and then incorporating
these indices into a single regression model.
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Units of Analysis
The choice of units of analysis was dictated by
the availability of Census Bureau data.
one of the independent variables,

Measurement of

relative deprivation,

entailed comparisons between the socio-economic attain
ments of blacks in 1950 and those in 1960.
possible indices of such attainments,

One of two

education, was not

available in the 1950 census reports except for cities in
the South.

The other, median income, was reported, but

only for cities with populations of 100,000 or more in
1950.
1960,

To make the necessary comparisons between 1950 and
these cities had to become the units of analysis.
There were 169 such cities.

However,

a lack of

data for certain variables for a number of them made it
necessary to run the final regression analysis with a r e 
duced sample of 70 cities.'*'

Measures:

Riot Magnitude

The dependent variable riot magnitude was measured
in terms of casualties resulting from the riot.

^"United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, United States Census of Population: 1 9 5 0 , Vol.
II, Characteristics of the Po pu la ti on , parts 3-42; United
States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, U n i 
ted States Census of Population: 1 9 6 0 , Vol. II, Character
istics of the P o p u l a t i o n , parts 3-44, Tables 77 and 78.
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Information was obtained on the total number of persons
killed, wounded,

or injured in the riots that took place

between 1964 and 1968.

For each riot these three figures

were summed to form the composite index riot m a g n i t u d e .
The figures on the number of persons killed were modified
by multiplying them by 1.5 since it was felt that the raw
number of killed,
wounded figures,

always small relative to injured and
did not adequately reflect the serious

ness of a riot in which persons lost their lives.

Data

on riot casualties were obtained from the New York Times
using its index, Facts of F i l e , and the Senate Subcommit
tee on Investigations report, R i o t s :

Civil and Criminal

D is or d e r s .^

Measures:

Independent Variables

Relative Deprivation
As posited earlier, relative deprivation for
blacks in the years prior to the riots involved an inter
action between three f a c t o r s , two of which have been in
dexed in this study:

presumed growth of black

2
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
O pe ra ti on s, Riots:
Civil and Criminal Disorders, H e a r 
ings , before a Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Investigations, Senate, 90th Cong.,
1st s e s s . , November 1, 2, 3, and 6, 1967.
Part 1. (Wash
ington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1967).
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expectations stemming from a rise in living standards
during the 1 9 5 0 ’s, and the gap between whites and blacks
in the 1 9 6 0 ’s.

Growth in living standards in the 1950's

involved gains in income and education,

and ideally both

would be incorporated into an index of rising expecta
tions.

However,

as mentioned above, to measure this rise

in expectations requires figures for both 1950 and 1960,
and only data on median income were available.
quently,

Conse

growth in black expectations was indexed by

growth in median income.

The size of this growth was

computed by subtracting the 1950 Census Bureau median in
come figures from those of 1960.

The difference between

the 1950 and 1960 figures was then divided by the 1950
figure to get a percentage increase in median income
score.

This percentage is regarded as an index of black

expectations.

Since the Kerner Commission surveys r e 

vealed that the overwhelming majority of the rioters were
male

(typically over 90 percent)

the data on median i n 

come were gathered for black males only.
The second measureable element of relative depri
vation is the white-black gap, which will here be termed
’’discrimination."

For each city discrimination was m e a 

sured by subtracting black male median income for 1960
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from 'total male median income for 1960.

Ideally figures

from white males only would be used in computing the dis
crimination score.

However,

the Census Bureau did not

provide such.
To capture the essence of relative deprivation as
stemming from an interaction between expectations and dis
crimination, with both factors being necessary for r e l a 
tive deprivation,

the final relative deprivation index

was computed by multiplying the expectations score by the
discrimination score.

Coercive Force
The social control variable of coercive force was
measured in terms of the size of the city police depart
ment.

Information on police department size was obtained

from the Uniform Crime Reports for the United States for
3

1967,

compiled by the Department of Justice,

and from

4
The Municipal Yearbook 1 9 7 0 .

3
U.S. Department of Justice, Uniform Crime Reports
for the United States 1967 (Washington D.C.:
Government
Printing Office, 1967), pp. 74-75.
4

The International City Management Association,
The Municipal Yearbook 1970 (Washington, D.C.:
City M a n 
agement Association, 1970), pp. 450-469.
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Facilitation
A prior riots index was constructed by summing
the riot magnitude scores of each city for the years from
1964 to 1967.

To test Proposition 3, which held that p r e 

vious riots paved the way for later ones, prior riots was
added to the other independent variables in a special
equation in which the dependent variables was the m a g n i 
tude of the 1968 riots.

Governmental Capacity
To test the fourth proposition which predicts a
negative relationship between governmental capacity and
the magnitude of the riots,

two separate variables were

created to represent governmental capacity.

The first

was welfare expenditures by the city government in 1960;
the second,

total government expenditures by the city in

1960 for services other than welfare.

For both variables

the hypothesized relationship between them and riot m a g nitude is negative and linear.

Data for welfare and to-

al government expenditures were obtained from the City
and County Data Book for 1 9 6 2 .

5

United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, City and County Data Book 1962 (Washington,
D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1963), Tables 451 6c 452.
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The choice of welfare expenditures to index
governmental capacity seemed obvious.

Such expenditures

seemed a straightforward application of the principle b e 
hind governmental capacity:

channeling government r e 

sources directly to deprived individuals.
the well-known poverty of blacks,

In light of

it seemed a safe assump

tion that a substantial segment of such deprived indivi
duals would be black,

although the City and County Data

Book--the most systematic compilation of welfare figures
that could be found--did not provide information of what
proportion of a city's welfare expenditures went to
blacks.
Total government expenditures represents money
spent on public transportation,
hospitals.

sanitation, parks, and

The choice of it as an index of governmental

capacity did not seem as obvious since the services in
volved are not expressly intended to assist the poor.
However,

since the poor are disproportionatly dependent

on services such as public transportation to help them in
getting jobs,

or public hospitals because they cannot af

ford expensive private ones,

it was felt that including

expenditures on these nonwelfare types of services was
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necessary to get a complete picture of a city's effort to
deal with the grievances of deprived persons.

Control Variables
A control variable, black population in 1960, was
added to the other independent variables.

This is to

separate out trivial relationships between the dependent
variable and the independent variables of police depart
ment size, welfare,

and total government expenditures.

Riot magnitude will naturally correlate with the size of
the black population alone.
the bigger the riot.

And,

The more blacks in a city,
the size of each of the three

independent variables just mentioned will also correlate
with black population,

since each will be greater for

larger cities and the larger the city,
larger the black population.

typically,

the

If black population were

not inserted as a control, we would observe strong but
trivial relationships between riot magnitude and the three
independent variables due to the number of blacks in the
city.

The Regression Models
A regression model is a statistical equation spe
cifying a positive or negative linear relationship between
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a dependent variable,
equation,

set on the left-hand side of the

and one or more independent variables,

the right-hand side.

set on

A regression coefficient is computed

for each independent variable.

The regression coefficient

indicates the direction of the linear relationship between
its associated independent variable and the dependent v a r 
iable when all other independent variables in the equation
have been held constant.

’Holding constant'

is a statis

tical procedure for separating out the effects of a given
independent variable on the dependent variable from the
effects of other independent variables on the same depen
dent variable.

Because the procedure is incorporated

into the computation of the regression coefficient,
regression coefficient,

the

if statistically significant,

tells us that a relationship which cannot be accounted
for in terms of the other independent variables exists
between its respective independent variable and the d e 
pendent variable;
exist,

conversely,

if such a relationship does

the regression coefficient will not be statisti

cally significant.
In this study each of the four propositions p r e 
sented above holds that a statistically significant r el a
tionship of a specified nature,

either positive or
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negative, will exist between a certain independent v a r 
iable and riot magnitude after the other independent v a r 
iables have been held constant.

So, for example, pro po 

sition 1 posits that a relationship exists between r el a
tive deprivation and riot magnitude after police depart
ment s i z e , prior r i o t s , total government expendi tu re s,
and welfare expenditures have been held constant; p r op o
sition 2 asserts that a relationship exists between p o 
lice department size and riot magnitude after relative
d epri va ti on , prior r i o t s , and so forth, have been held
constant.

Regression analysis is the appropriate statis

tical procedure for testing propositions of this sort.
Accordingly,

each of the above indices will be incorpo

rated into a regression model, with the regression c oef
ficient being used to test the proposition relating each
*

of the indices for the independent variables to riot
magnitude.
Restating each proposition in the language of the
regression model, proposition 1 predicts that the regres
sion coefficient for relative deprivation will be signif
icant and positive; proposition 2 asserts that the coef
ficient for police department size will be significant
and positive; proposition 3 predicts the coefficient for
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prior riots will be significant and positive;

and p r o 

position 4 holds that the coefficients for total govern
ment expenditures and welfare expenditures will be signif
icant and negative.
Each proposition will be regarded as falsified if
either of two conditions is met:

First,

the regression

coefficient is statistically significant, but the sign of
the coefficient indicates the relationship is not in the
predicted direction.

Second,

the regression coefficient

is not statistically significant.
cance will be set at the

Statistical signifi

.05 level.

For propositions 1,

2, and 4 the following regression model is specified.

EQ1:

RM = A q + (^(RD) + 32 (PDS) + 33 <WEXP)
+ 34 (TGEXP) + 35 (BP) + e

where
RM = Riot Magnitude
JU

RD = Relative Deprivation (+)/v
PDS = Police Department Size
WEXP = Welfare Expenditures

(+)
(-)

TGEXP = Total Government Expenditures
BP = Black Population

(-)

(+)

'Pluses and minuses represent the predicted direction of
the relationship between the variable and riot m a g n i t u d e .
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To test proposition 3, which predicted a positive
relationship between the magnitude of previous riots and
later riots,

EQ2:

the following model is specified.

RM68 = A Q + ^ ( R D )

+ $2 (PDS) 4- £3 ( W E X P )

+ 3 . (TGEXP) + 3 c (BP) + 3 . (PR) + e
4
D
0 _____
where
RM68 = Riot Magnitude for 1968
PR = The total magnitude of prior riots from
1964 to 1967 (+)

TABLE 9
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR EQUATION 1

RM
RD
PDS
WEXP
TGEXP
BP

RM

RD

1.0

-.07
1.00

WEXP

TGEXP

.42

.38

.57

.64

.01

- .06

-.07

-.02

1.00

.90

.93

.92

1.00

.95

.79

1.00

.92

PDS

BP

1.00
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Results of Regression Analysis:
Equation 1

EQ1

:

RM = -32890 + 2 5 (RD) - .07(PDS) - 5 2 (WEXP)

a

(.18)*

(3.98)***

(2.81)***

+ 1 2 (TGEXP) + 8 3 (BP)
(4.03)***
(1.89)**
* Not significant at the
**
***

.25 level.

Significant at the .05 level.
Significant at the .005 level.

R 2 = .69

F = 29.6

N = 70

The scores in parentheses below the variables are the t
scores.

As the reader can readily observe, Proposition 1,
which predicted a positive relationship between relative
deprivation and the magnitude of the r i o t s , has been r e 
futed.

While the relationship between relative depriva

tion and riot magnitude is in the predicted direction,

it

fails to attain statistical significance by a wide margin.
The chances are better than one out of four that the true
regression coefficient is 0--i.e., no relationship
whatsoever.
Proposition 2, positing a positive relationship
between riot magnitude and coercive force as measured by
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police department s i z e , has also been refuted.

One

possible explanation of this finding that would be con
sistent with proposition 2 is that, while greater police
department size did have the specified effect of generat
ing more hostile police-citizen en co un te rs , when the riots
broke out it had an even stronger effect of stifling
vi ol ence--hence, the observed negative relationship.
This, however,

is speculation,

and is offered simply as

grist for other analytic mills.
strued as an attempt to

It should not be con

’save the t h e o r y . ’

the observed negative relationships,

In light of

the conclusion must

be that proposition 2 stands as falsified.
The results for proposition 4 are mixed,
one might argue that,

on balance,

though

they support it.

The

relationship between riot magnitude and total government
expenditures is significant, but is not in the predicted
direction.

On the other hand,

the more direct measure of

a city government's capacity to deal with grievances,
welfare expenditures,

is significant and is in the p r e 

dicted direction.
The explanation here may be that cities with more
serious problems of black deprivation spent more to r e 
lieve it through better public services.

However,

except
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when channeled into the more direct measure of welfare,
such expenditures did little good.

Another approach to

interpreting the results would be simply to forgo any
attempt to explain the positive relationship between riot
magnitude and total government expenditures, and to ask
the question of which of the two variables is a more valid
measure of a g ov e r n m e n t 's capacity to deal with black
g r i ev an ce s.

If one regards welfare expenditures as the

more valid of the two, then proposition 4 has escaped disconfirm at io n; if one regards total government expendi
tures as more valid,
as valid,

then it has not.

If neither is seen

the question is left unresolved one way or the

other.

TABLE 10
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR EQUATION 2

RM68
RD
PDS
WEXP
TGEXP
BP
PR

RM68

RD

1.0

-.10
1.00

PDS

BP

PR

.50

.46

.04

-.06

-.07

-.02

T .00

.90

.93

.92

.37

1.00

.95

.79

.19

1.00

.92

.32

1.00

.47

WEXP

TGEXP

.25

.34

.01
1.00

1.00
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Results of Regression Analysis:
Equation 2

EQ2

:

RM68 = -36203 +

.06(RD) - 1 . 6 7 (PDS) - 1 . 0 4 (WEXP)
(.9.7)*
(6.93) ***
(3.11) **

+ 2 . 7 9 (TGEXP) + .35(BP) - .19(PR)
(6.30)***

(1.19)*

* Not significant at the

.1 level.

** Significant at the

.005 level.

*** Significant at the

.001 level.

R 2 = .76

In equation 2

F = 34.4

a

(2.66)**

N = 69

the magnitude of the riots a city

experienced in 1968 was regressed against prior r i o t s ,
measured in terms of the magnitude of the riots that took
place in a city during the years from 1963 to 1967.

Pro

position 3 held that the magnitude of the 1968 riot would
be positively related to past riots, and it has been disconfirmed.

While the relationship is significant,

as

shown in Equation 2 , it is negative rather than positive.
a
One might explain this negative relationship by arguing
that the riots a city experienced in past years took a
sufficiently heavy toll in causalties and property damage
to deter people from rioting again;

and/or,

the riots in

duced the city government to implement social reforms that
removed the motive for the riots.
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Further Analysis
In reporting proposition 1 on relative deprivation to have been disconfirmed no explanations were o f 
fered, because none could be thought of.

Considerable

effort was expended to develop a relative deprivation
theory that seemed to fit the social circumstances and
experiences of blacks in the United States,
the best chance of explaining the riots.

and that stood

It did not.

The

theory of relative deprivation offered in this study has
been falsified when tested against this body of evidence.
Not as a means of rescuing the relative depriva
tion hypothesis but merely for exploratory purposes,
other models were tested.

two

They differed from Equation 1

only in the way in which relative deprivation was defined.
In the first model,

relative deprivation was defined in

terms of growth in median income alone.

For want of a

better term this might be called a "truncated" pr og r e s 
sive deprivation model in that no frustrating element
analogous to perception of white-black differences is b e 
ing identified.

The proposition here is the loose and

open-ended one that growth was in some way behind the
riots, but just how this normally satisfying development
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of increasing income turned into a basis for violence is
being left to speculation.

TABLE 11
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR EQUATION 3
RM
1.0

RDG

PDS

WEXP

BP

.10

.42

.38

.57

.64

1.00

.03

-.002

.01

.03

.90

.93

.93

1.00

.95

.75
.92

PDS

1.00

WEXP
TGEXP
BP

EQ3:

TGEXP

O
O

RM

RDG

1.00

RM = -80190 + 111.5 (RDG)+ - ,07(PDS) - 50(WEXP)
(1.11)*
(4.09)**** (2.70)***
+ 1 2 (TGEXP) + 8 7 (BP)
(3.94)****
(2.0)**
* Not significant at the

.1 level.

** Significant

at the .025

level.

*** Significant

at the .005

level.

**** Significant

at the .001

level.

t Relative deprivation defined as growth in median
income, 1950-1960.
R

= .70

F = 30.5

N = 70

Here with Equation 3 we see that, while the r ela
tionship of relative deprivation defined as growth to
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riot magnitude is in the predicted direction,
statistically significant.

it is not

The chances are better than

one out of ten that no relationship at all exists.
A second model was tested,

identical to the one

above except that relative deprivation was defined solely
in terms of discrimination--the white-black gap.

The

proposition here would be that prior expectations gene r
ated by growth had nothing to do with the riots.

Rela

tive deprivation was solely in terms of blacks feeling
deprived relative to whites,
tween the two groups,

and the greater the gap b e 

the greater the magnitude of the

riots.

TABLE 12
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR EQUATION 4

RM
RDD
PDS
WEXP
TGEXP

BP

RM

RDD

1.0

-.19
1.00

BP

WEXP

TGEXP

.42

.38

.58

.64

-.04

-.09

-.13

-.09

1.00

.90

.93

.92

1.00

.95

.79

1.00

.92

PDS

1.00

120.
EQ4:

RM = -104

-

1 2 (RDD)+
(.33)*

+ 1 2 (TGEXP) +
(4.00)****
*

-

.07(PDS) (4.00)****

5 2 (WEXP)
(2.85)***

8 3 (BP)
(1.95)**

Not significant at the .25 level.

**

Significant at

the .025

level.

***

Significant at

the .005

level.

****

Significant at

the .001

level.

t Relative deprivation defined as
"discrimination.11
R

= .70

F = 31.7

Here again,

N = 74

in Equation 4, one finds no support

for the relative deprivation variable.

Not only is the

relationship not statistically significant,

it is n e g a 

tive rather than positive as predicted.

Summary and Conclusions
This study was conceived as means of providing a
test of G u r r 's relative deprivation theory of political
violence.

G u r r 1s own test of his theory was done on a

cross-national basis, using aggregate measures for each
of his variables,

including relative deprivation.

By

choosing a multinational sample, Gurr was forced to adopt
a least common denominator approach to measuring relative
deprivation;

an approach that resulted in measures so
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general as to render his final results--which Gurr says
support his relative deprivation model--equally consistent
w ith a rival and more parsimonious absolute deprivation,
or misery model.
In reaction to t h i s , the present study proceeded
from the premise that,

if variables defined in terms of

aggregate measures are to be used owing to problems with
direct survey measurement of

’states of m i n d , ' relative

deprivation should be defined with respect to the par ti cu 
lar pattern of conditions by which it developed.

Of the

three patterns presented by Gurr--aspirational, p ro gr es 
sive, and decremental--at least the aspirational and p r o 
gressive forms are sufficiently diverse in their empiri
cally measureable properties to allow them to be distin
guished from the rival misery model on the basis of aggr e
gate measures alone.

This implies focusing on only one

case of political violence, which can then be closely ex
amined to determine which pattern of relative deprivation
was most likely involved.
priate for that pattern,

Using aggregate measures appoone can construct statistical

models which, when tested, will yield evidence that
clearly corroborates or refutes the relative deprivation
thesis.
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Following this procedure,
United States were singled out.

the ghetto riots in the
A survey of previous

studies of the riots made clear that,

if relative depri

vation was responsible for the riots,

it would have been

in the form of progressive deprivation.

Gains blacks

made in the form of increased incomes and higher educa
tional attainments ruled out other forms,
misery model.

including the

However, unlike the progressive depriva

tion pattern specified by Gurr,

the frustrating element

for blacks was not a precipitous decline of value capa
bilities.

No evidence was encountered that incomes or

educational attainments had dropped off before riots broke
out.

Frustration,

rather,

came in the form of a sudden

change in the standards by which blacks assessed their
value attainments.

The dramatic and rapid success of the

civil rights movement induced them to think suddenly in
terms of equality with whites.

This frustrated prior ex

pectations , generated by growth in income and education
during the 1950's,

of achieving a satisfactory social’

status.
In accord with this,

a regression model was con

structed in which relative deprivation was defined as a
product of growth in median incomes for black men between
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1950 and 1960 and the size of the gap separating black
from white men on median income as of 1960.
varialbes--coercive force,

facilitation,

Three other

and governmental

capacity--were defined and included in the regression
model along w it h relative deprivation.
In light of the results obtained,

the main con

clusion is that relative deprivation did not play a role
in inducing blacks to riot.

A significant relationship

was not found between the variables relative deprivation
and riot m a g n i t u d e .
Similarly disconfirming results were observed for
other variables with the possible exception of government
al capacity.

That was indexed by total government expen

ditures and by welfare expendi tu re s.

The latter did bear

a significant relationship to ghetto riots, and, if b e 
cause of its character as a more direct instrument for
dealing with gr i ev an ce s, it can be regarded as a more
valid measure of governmental capacity,

then the proposi

tion that governmental capacity is negatively related to
the magnitude of riots has not been falsified.
One would hesitate to say that this study totally
and conclusively refutes G u r r 1s theory.

If nothing else,

methodological error can always be charged,

and such

124.
charges must be taken especially seriously in a study
using aggregate data to tap psychological phenomena.
stipulation that

'further tests are necessary,'

as necessary as it is trite.

The

is, alas,

Ideally these tests would

employ direct' psychological measures of hypothesized
states of frustration and anger.

However,

if they are

based on inferential aggregate m e a s u r e s , they should focus
on single instances of political violence that allow for
careful specification of the form relative deprivation
took.

In any case, pending such tests,

the present study

is offered as at least one piece of negative evidence to
be weighed as one ponders the question of just why men
rebel.
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